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ARTICLE

Bringing the European Eel Back from the
Brink: The Need for a New Agreement under
the Convention on Migratory Species
CHRIS WOLD*
The European eel is considered “Critically Endangered.” Its
population has been declining due to overutilization, barriers to migration such as dams, pollution, and climate change. The international community has responded by including the European eel in
Appendix II of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (“CITES”) to regulate international trade and Appendix II of the Convention on Migratory Species (“CMS”) to help improve the species conservation status. The EU has taken regional
action to prohibit imports into and exports from EU Member States,
although intra-EU trade is permissible. Despite these actions, the
eel’s conservation status might not be improving. The eel’s Appendix
II status on CITES regulates only international trade. The CMS
Appendix II listing does not impose any specific conservation obligations on the Parties. No other international treaty has the competence to manage the full suite of threats across the eel’s range.
Thus, European eel conservation would benefit from a new international legal instrument negotiated under the auspices of CMS.
Unlike other agreements, a legal instrument negotiated under CMS
can cover the full range of the European eel’s freshwater and marine
habitat and address the full range of threats to the species. CMS
Agreements can be legally binding or not. Regardless of the instrument’s legal status, it should prohibit or regulate taking; prohibit
*
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or regulate trade, potentially through a CDS; establish an advisory
body to assess new scientific information and review management
strategies; and include reporting obligations to help monitor the
success or failure of management strategies.
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INTRODUCTION

In books and movies, eels are commonly depicted as sneaky
creatures with a propensity for tricking other creatures.1 The
French idiom “there’s an eel under the rock” refers to a dubious
situation.2 They are also considered to be dangerous creatures that
bring catastrophes.3 In the Pacific island myth, the eel-god Tuna
(the Samoan word for eel) takes the form of an eel to watch women
bathe; a woman who eats an eel is considered possessed of an evil
spirit.4 In other cultures, eels are sacred.5
Regardless of their depiction in myth and movies, modern day
eels are big business and in great peril. Maine fishermen have sold
glass eels to Asian dealers for as much as $2,600 per pound.6 In
2012, the Maine catch of glass eels was worth $38 million.7 In addition, as catadromous species, eels spawn in the marine environment and spend their adult lives in continental waters such as rivers, lakes, estuaries, and lagoons.8 This catadromous life history
makes them vulnerable to a variety of threats. In addition to overexploitation for Japanese cuisine, including sushi (unagi),9 eels encounter barriers to migration such as dams as they swim upstream
and down.10 They also face threats from disease, parasites, and climate change.11

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See, e.g., Little Mermaid, in which two eels, Flotsam and Jetsam, search for
victims for the wicked Ursula; they were, for example, given the task of luring Ariel to Ursula’s lair. LITTLE MERMAID (Disney 1989).
Eric Feunteun & Tony Robinet, Freshwater Eels and People in France, in
EELS AND HUMANS 75, 75 (Katsumi Tsukamoto & Mari Kuroki ed., (2014))
(in French, “Il y a anguille sous roche”).
Id.
2 ROBERT W. WILLIAMSON, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF CENTRAL
POLYNESIA 274 (1924).
T. Kieran McCarthy, Eels and People in Ireland: From Mythology to International Eel Stock Conservation, in EELS AND HUMANS 13, 14–15 (Katsumi
Tsukamoto & Mari Kuroki eds., 2014).
Annie Sneed, American Eel Is in Endanger of Extinction, SCI. AM. (Dec. 1,
2014), https://perma.cc/3NYR-BUQT.
Id.
David M.P. Jacoby et al., Synergistic Patterns of Threat and the Challenges
Facing Global Anguillid Eel Conservation, 4 GLOB. ECOLOGY &
CONSERVATION 321, 322 (2015).
See infra Section II.C.1.
See infra Section II.C.2.
See infra Section II.C.3–4.
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International concern has been growing for all eel species in
the family Anguillidae due to their significant population declines,12 but regional and international efforts have so far focused
on the European eel (Anguilla anguilla). In 2007, the European
Union (“EU”) adopted a regulation that requires EU Member
Range States to prepare Eel Management Plans (“EMPs”) with a
goal of 40% escapement of adult eels into the marine environment.13 Later in 2007, the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (“CITES”)14 included the
species in Appendix II.15 In 2008, the European eel was first listed
as “Critically Endangered” on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”) Red List of Threatened Species.16 That
same year, the European eel was added to the List of Threatened
and/or Declining Species in the Northeast Atlantic under the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the NorthEast Atlantic (“OSPAR”).17 In 2014, the Convention on Migratory
12.

Anguillid Eel Specialist Group (AESG): About AESG, IUCN FRESHWATER
SPECIALIST GRP., https://perma.cc/23DD-7B5S (“For 30 years or more there
has been growing concern amongst stakeholders in relation to the decline in
recruitment and/or populations of a number of species within the family Anguillidae.”).
13.
The provision provides as follows:
The objective of each Eel Management Plan shall be to reduce anthropogenic mortalities so as to permit with high probability the escapement to the sea of at least 40% of the silver eel biomass relative to the
best estimate of escapement that would have existed if no anthropogenic influences had impacted the stock. The Eel Management Plan
shall be prepared with the purpose of achieving this objective in the
long term.
Council Regulation 1100/2007, Establishing Measures for the Recovery of the
Stock of European Eel, art. 2, 2007 O.J. (L 248) 1, 3, 4 (EC),
https://perma.cc/7FCN-TXCG [hereinafter EU Eel Regulation].
14. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force
July 1, 1975), https://perma.cc/A6UP-M6V9 [hereinafter CITES].
15. CITES Appendices II, III (valid from Apr. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/XV8ZYUW6.
16. DAVID JACOBY & MATT GOLLOCK, IUCN, THE IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED
SPECIES – ANGUILLA ANGUILLA, EUROPEAN EEL 1, 3 (2014),
https://perma.cc/J8QZ-KVAA. The European eel was again classified as
“Critically Endangered” in 2010 and 2014. Id.
17. OSPAR List of Threatened and/or Declining Species and Habitats (Ref. No.
2008-6), pt. II, 2008, https://perma.cc/WV8U-VAJH. OSPAR is the treaty
and commission through which fifteen States and “the EU cooperate to protect the marine environment of the North-East Atlantic” Ocean. About
OSPAR, OSPAR COMM’N, https://perma.cc/A5B2-F4AL.
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Species (“CMS”)18 included the European eel in Appendix II due to
its unfavorable conservation status.19 Despite these actions, the
eel’s conservation status may not be improving.20 The population
remains in a “critical state”; the “promising increase” in recruitment in some recent years “may or may not be the result of protective measures.”21
Consequently, the CMS Secretariat and the Sargasso Sea
Commission22 sponsored the First Range States Workshop on the
European Eel to review the conservation status of and existing
management measures for the species.23 That meeting concluded
that a second workshop that includes additional Range States, particularly from North Africa, would be valuable.24 The meeting also
concluded that the second workshop should focus on the nature of
a CMS legal instrument for the European eel (legally binding or
non-legally binding) and the feasibility of including the American
eel in any such instrument at a later time.25
18.
19.

20.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June
23, 1979, 1651 U.N.T.S. 333 (entered into force 1983), http://perma.cc/XP9QGBWZ [hereinafter CMS].
CMS Appendix II, at 14, https://perma.cc/GXL2-YMS5. The CMS Parties include species in Appendix II “which have an unfavourable conservation status
and which require international agreements for their conservation and management, as well as those which have a conservation status which would significantly benefit from the international cooperation that could be achieved by
an international agreement.” CMS, supra note 18, at art. IV(1).
Willem Dekker, Management of the Eel Is Slipping through Our Hands!:
Distribute Control and Orchestrate National Protection, 73 ICES J. MARINE
SCI. 2442, 2443 (2016) (“Post-evaluation in 2015 recently indicated that
hardly any improvement in the status of the stocks has been achieved, and
that—on average—mortality has not been reduced any further since 2012.”).
The generation length of the European eel is roughly 15 years, however.
Jacoby et al., supra note 8, at 325, fig.1. As a consequence, it may be too early
to determine whether existing measures are having a positive impact on the
eel’s conservation status.
INT’L COUNCIL FOR THE EXPL. OF THE SEA, REPORT OF THE JOINT
EIFAAC/ICES WORKING GROUP ON EELS (WGEEL), ICES CM
2013/ACOM:18, at 180 (2013), https://perma.cc/2RSX-AV6G.
For more information on the Sargasso Sea Commission, see SARGASSO SEA
COMM’N, https://perma.cc/55RX-CJX5.
Documents for the meeting can found at The First Range State Workshop on
the European Eel, CMS, https://perma.cc/YR9Z-ARH9.
CMS, Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, Doc.
UNEP/CMS/Eels
WS1/Report, ¶
145
(Oct.
13–14,
2016),
https://perma.cc/4DX2-DGNF.
Id. ¶ 145-58.
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At the Twelfth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to
CMS,26 the Parties adopted a “concerted action”27 for the European
Eel28 that calls on CMS Parties to convene a second workshop of
Range States “to explore all options that might help to strengthen
conservation efforts for the European eel.”29 In particular, the
meeting “should focus on exploring synergies between existing instruments, to solidify the role of CMS, and associated mechanism[s] of implementation, in on-going conservation efforts.”30
In light of these events, this Article assesses the nature and
content that a CMS instrument could play in strengthening conservation measures for the European eel. It reviews existing legally binding and non-legally binding CMS instruments and examines the relative advantages and disadvantages of each type of
instrument for the conservation and management of the European
eel. It also explores and sets out the possible content of an instrument, including measures to protect the eel’s migration and spawning grounds.
To accomplish these tasks, Section II begins by briefly summarizing the life history and scientific gaps in knowledge of European
eels, as well as the various threats to the species, for the purpose
of determining whether and to what extent an international agree-

26.
27.

28.
29.
30.

For information about and documents from this meeting, see Twelfth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CMS, CMS, https://perma.cc/RQ93GVBR.
“Concerted actions” are defined as:
[P]riority conservation measures, projects, or institutional arrangements undertaken to improve the conservation status of selected Appendix I and Appendix II species or selected groups of Appendix I and
Appendix II species that
a) involve measures that are the collective responsibility of Parties acting in concert; or
b) are designed to support the conclusion of an instrument under Article IV of the Convention and enable conservation measures to
be progressed in the meantime or represent an alternative to such an
instrument[.]
CMS Res. 12.28, Concerted Actions, Doc. UNEP/CMS/Res. 12.28, ¶ 1 (Oct.
2017), https://perma.cc/L6C4-GHT4.
CMS, Concerted Action on the European Eel (Anguilla anguilla),
Doc. UNEP/CMS/Concerted Action 12.1 (Oct. 2017), https://perma.cc/B3D5HD2M [hereinafter CMS Concerted Action on the European Eel].
Id. at 1.
Id.
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ment might be necessary. Section III describes the need for international cooperation to conserve and manage the European eel
given the scientific information included in Section II. Section IV
evaluates the different types of CMS legal instruments, assessing
in particular the similarities and differences between legally binding and non-legally binding instruments. Section V addresses
whether CMS is the proper forum for developing an international
instrument for the European eel in light of other international
agreements and the CMS criteria found in CMS Resolution 12.8
for evaluating potential new legal instruments. Section VI explores
the possible content of an instrument, including key elements of
such an instrument for the conservation of the European eel. Section VII briefly comments on the possible extension of a CMS instrument concerning the European eel to the American eel (A. rostrata), which faces similar threats. Finally, Section VIII concludes
that the role of CMS in European eel conservation must be solidified because only CMS has the flexibility and breadth to address
all of the threats to the European eel across its full geographic
range.
II. CONSERVATION STATUS OF THE EUROPEAN
EEL
A.

Life History

The European eel is one of 16 anguillid species.31 Anguillids
are unusual among aquatic species for a variety of reasons. They
are facultatively catadromous: they spawn in the marine environment and live the majority of their lives in continental waters such
as rivers, lakes, estuaries, lagoons, and coastal waters.32 They are
also unusual among aquatic species in that they reproduce just
once before dying.33 On average, the generation length of the European eel has been estimated at 15 years,34 and it is widely dispersed, inhabiting the marine and freshwater environments of 57

31.
32.
33.
34.

Jacoby et al., supra note 8, at 323.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 325, tbl.1.
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States and territories.35 Despite this wide dispersal, the European
eel is considered a single stock—that is, it is panmictic36 because
all adults spawn in the southwestern part of the Sargasso Sea.37
The European eel’s life history makes for fascinating study.
The eel’s leptocephalus larvae hatch in Sargassum38 and then drift
with the ocean currents towards Europe and North Africa.39 The
larvae metamorphose as they cross the ocean; by the time they
reach the continental shelf of Europe and North Africa, they have
completed their metamorphosis into transparent “glass eels” and
enter continental waters.40 After a period of time, they begin to
take on pigmentation and become known as elvers.41 Continuing
their transformation, European eels then enter their growth stage,
during which they are known as yellow eels.42 During this time,
they eat a wide range of insects, worms, molluscs, crustaceans, and
fish.43 This stage shows great variation: the transformation into a

35.

36.

37.
38.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Albania; Algeria; Austria; Belarus; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Egypt; Estonia; Faroe Islands; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Gibraltar; Greece; Guernsey;
Iceland; Ireland; Isle of Man; Israel; Italy; Jersey; Latvia; Lebanon; Libya;
Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of;
Malta; Mauritania; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Morocco; Netherlands;
Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; Serbia; Slovakia;
Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tunisia; Turkey; Ukraine; United Kingdom. JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 4.
INT’L COUNCIL FOR THE EXPL. OF THE SEA, REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON EEL
AND CITES 33 (2015), https://perma.cc/UGD8-MY2E [hereinafter REPORT OF
THE WORKSHOP ON EELS AND CITES]. The report notes that scientists are not
sure “[w]hether this panmixia is achieved by random mating of adults in the
spawning area in the southwestern part of the Sargasso Sea or by random
dispersal of the larvae on their route towards the continent.” Id.
INT’L COUNCIL FOR THE EXPL. OF THE SEA, REPORT OF THE JOINT
EIFAAC/ICES/GFCM WORKING GROUP ON EEL (WGEEL) 8 (2015),
http://perma.cc/7CQP-MS7L [hereinafter 2015 WGEEL REPORT].
Sargassum is a Genus of Large Brown Algae that Floats in Island-like
Masses, U.S. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://perma.cc/KE5NZLAU. The Sargasso Sea is roughly 3,000 km2. Rep. of the First Range
States Workshop on the European Eel, supra note 24, ¶ 21 (statement of
Éric Feunteun).
JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 4.
2015 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 8.
INT’L COUNCIL FOR THE EXPL. OF THE SEA, REPORT OF THE JOINT
EIFAAC/ICES/GFCM WORKING GROUP ON EEL (WGEEL) 196 (2014),
http://perma.cc/6WSG-NW9L [hereinafter 2014 WGEEL REPORT].
Id.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/1
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yellow eel “may take place in marine, brackish (transitional), or
freshwaters,” and the stage may last from 2 to 25 years but can
exceed 50 years,44 depending on “temperature (latitude and longitude), ecosystem characteristics, and density-dependent processes.”45 Sexual differentiation occurs during this life history
stage, but the mechanism is not fully understood.46 Sexual differentiation likely depends on a number of factors, particularly density; males predominate in areas of high eel density, and females
predominate as eel density decreases.47 Rapidly growing individuals typically become males, whereas slow-growing eels tend to develop as females.48 High temperatures and saline conditions may
also favor development.49
As a result of these factors, eels metamorphose into silver eels
and reach sexual maturity more quickly in the southern part of
their range.50 Silver eels then migrate to the Sargasso Sea where
they spawn and die; incredibly, no one has yet seen a European eel
spawn.51
B. Declines
Determining either positive or negative changes in the global
stock of the European eel “is difficult due to limited data and the
poor understanding of the relationship between recruitment, freshwater populations, and escapement.”52 Nonetheless, scientists
agree that the species as a whole continues to decline.53

44.
45.
46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

2015 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 8.
Id. See also OSPAR COMM’N, BACKGROUND DOCUMENT FOR EUROPEAN EEL:
ANGUILLA ANGUILLA 5 (2010), https://perma.cc/MZ6X-6GLW.
2014 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 41, at 196.
Daniele Bevacqua et al., A Global Viability Assessment of the European Eel,
21 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 3323, 3330 (2015); Andrew J. H. Davey & Donald J. Jellyman, Sex Determination in Freshwater Eels and Management
Options for Manipulation of Sex, 15 REVS. IN FISH BIOLOGY & FISHERIES 37,
37–38, 43 (2005) (“High proportions of female silver eels migrating from
some upstream areas, lakes and large rivers may be due to low population
density or poor conditions for growth in these habitats.”).
Davey & Jellyman, supra note 47, at 37.
Id. at 37–38.
2015 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 8.
2014 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 41, at 9.
JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 6.
Id. at 8.
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Using data sets from certain countries where data has been
gathered over a longer time period, scientists report dramatic declines—approximately 90%—in the recruitment of glass eels since
the early 1980s.54 Recruitment hit a low point in 2011 with a recruitment rate of less than 1% for the North Sea and less than 5%
elsewhere in the species’ range relative to recruitment between
1960 and 1979.55
Yellow and silver eels have also experienced declines of greater
than 50% over three generations (45 years).56 These declines are
perhaps less pronounced than expected “partially due to density
dependent mortality”; however, more precipitous declines may be
masked by the broad age range of yellow eels that could create “a
time lag in knock-on population effects”57 and a lack of data.58
C. Threats
The complex life history of the European eel challenges our
understanding of how different threats impact or potentially impact the species,59 and the contribution of each threat to the eel’s
decline is not fully understood.60 Nonetheless, this Article summarizes these threats to put the global conservation challenge in perspective and to underscore the need for global, multilateral solutions.61 For example, scientists believe that the population decline
of the European eel is caused by a variety of threats, including
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.
61.

Id. at 7.
Id. See also 2015 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 9.
JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 7.
Id.
Personal Communication with Dr. Matthew Gollock, Marine and Freshwater Programme Manager, Zoological Society of London (Sept. 15, 2017).
Matthew Gollock, Briefing Paper for the Workshop of European Eel Range
States, at 2 (2015), https://perma.cc/TJ5F-VCB8. See also 2014 WGEEL
REPORT, supra note 41, at 9 (stating that “the reasons for this decline are
uncertain”); Jacoby et al., supra note 8, at 326 (stating that “our ability to
determine the individual effects of these threats on population trends is complicated by the multiple life-stages across a range of environments” and
“how these stressors combine to contribute to declines in abundance of particular life-stages is still poorly understood”).
JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 11 (stating that “the significance of
any single threat, or the synergy it may have with other threats, is still
poorly understood”).
This article does not attempt to describe the various threats in detail; this
has been done elsewhere. See, e.g., id. at 11–12; Gollock, supra note 59, at
2–10.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/1
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“overexploitation, pollution, non-native parasites and other diseases, migratory barriers and other habitat loss, mortality during
passage through water turbines or pumps, and/or oceanic-factors
affecting migrations.”62 Significantly, these different threats affect
the European eel throughout its range.63
1.

Overutilization

Overutilization of European eels—from the glass eel stage to
the silver eel stage—for food and bait is potentially a significant
threat to the species.64 In fact, all 13 eel species assessed by the
IUCN were considered potentially threatened by fishing, harvesting, and other uses.65 With the decline of endangered Japanese eel
(A. japonica),66 the European eel has been the preferred eel for
Asian food markets.67 Despite the EU’s import/export ban, a black
market for European eel persists; estimates place the black-market price between $1,200 and $1,500 per kilo ($545 to $680 per
pound) in Asia.68 Since the EU import/export ban, greater pressure
has been placed on the American eel, which has fetched up to
$2,600 per pound;69 in 2012, the Maine catch of glass eels was
worth $38 million.70 Also since the EU ban, exports of the shortfin
eel (A. bicolor) in the glass eel stage from the Philippines have
sharply increased.71 In addition, in parts of the European eel’s
North African range (specifically Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia),

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Gollock, supra note 59, at 2–10; 2014 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 41, at 9.
2014 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 41, at 9.
Gollock, supra note 59, at 4 (stating that “[t]he glass eel fishery is also arguably the activity that removes the greatest number of eels from the aquatic
system”).
Jacoby et al., supra note 8, at 326.
DAVID JACOBY & MATT GOLLOCK, IUCN, THE IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED
SPECIES – ANGUILLA JAPONICA, JAPANESE EEL 1, 7–8 (2014),
https://perma.cc/X6GP-LFSZ.
JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 9.
Emma Bryce, Illegal Eel: Black Market Continues to Taint Europe’s Eel Fishery, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/SEA7-PH2K.
Sneed, supra note 6, at 3.
Id.
Jacoby et al., supra note 8, at 326; VICKI CROOK, TRAFFIC INT’L &
ZOOLOGICAL SOC’Y OF LONDON, SLIPPING AWAY: INTERNATIONAL ANGUILLA EEL
TRADE AND THE ROLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
12–17 (2014),
https://perma.cc/ZX4C-P4SL.
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as well as generally,72 exports have risen dramatically, causing the
CITES Animals Committee to recommend in July 2017 further investigation pursuant to its Review of Significant Trade.73
Regarding the European eel, EU Member States still catch 15
to 17 metric tons of glass eels annually for domestic markets,
where they are placed in aquaculture farms to grow until they are
of marketable size.74 Some stakeholders suspect that the total
catch is more than twice that.75 In fact, France has allocated itself
a quota of slightly more than 57 metric tons, which is roughly twice
the total allowed for EU consumption and restocking.76
2.

Habitat Loss/Barriers to Migration

Barriers to migration, such as dams, constitute a significant
threat to the European eel.77 Existing dams and the construction
of new dams are of great concern; in fact, Turkey—a Range State
of the European eel—has proposed building 575 new hydroelectric
dams.78 Such barriers constrain both upstream and downstream
eel migration. As eels move upstream, dams pose an obvious obstruction to potential growth habitat. A study of 335 dams (only
one with a functioning fish ladder) in Puerto Rico found American
eels upstream of 50% of dams shorter than 2.95 feet (0.9 meters)
but only 5% of those dams taller than 9.84 feet (3 meters).79 In ad-

72.
73.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

U.N. Env’t World Conservation Monitoring Ctr., Selection of Species for Inclusion in the Review of Significant Trade Following CoP17, Doc.
A/AC.29/13.3, annex 2, at 31 (2017), https://perma.cc/RV9T-QAUL.
CITES Animals Comm., Rep. on the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the Animals
Comm., Doc. A/AC.29/21, at 3 (July 18–22, 2017), https://perma.cc/KB4A227Q; CITES Dec. 17.188 (2016), https://perma.cc/U9JY-XF9Y (adopting the
recommendations in AC29 Com. 5).
Bryce, supra note 68.
As many as 20 tons of European eel are thought to be exported illegally to
Asia. Emma Bryce, Illegal Eel: Who Is Pilfering Europe’s Catch?, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 31, 2016), https://perma.cc/XC4G-EPH8.
Id.; Andrew Kerr, Sustainable Eel Grp., Eels III: European Eel Recovery: “It
is All About Collaboration” (June 22, 2016).
Gollock, supra note 59, at 7.
2015 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 66.
Patrick B. Cooney & Thomas J. Kwak, Spatial Extent and Dynamics of Dam
Impacts on Tropical Island Freshwater Fish Assemblages, 63 BIOSCIENCE
176, 182 (2013).
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dition, “considerable” habitat, much of which is suitable eel habitat, has been lost due to wetland reclamation projects, floodplain
drainage, and dredging, among other reasons.80
3.

Disease and Parasites

The introduction of the Japanese eel into Europe in the 1980s
for aquaculture also led to the introduction of the parasitic nematode Anguillicola crassus.81 A. crassus may impact the ability of
European eels to reach their spawning grounds due to its adverse
impacts on the fitness traits associated with the silvering stage of
maturation.82 However, the impacts on eel migration and reproductive success could be either negative or positive.83 Eels infected
with A. crassus demonstrate impaired swimming performance due
to damaged swim-bladders.84 Silver eels have “much higher infection levels than yellow eels,” and infected migrating silver eels may
not be able to reach the spawning grounds.85 Further, infected eels
may not be able to manage high pressure during their reproductive
migration.86 Conversely, infected eels may accelerate their metamorphosis and migrate and reproduce “before the energetic cost
imposed by the parasite becomes too high,” which could lead to
overall positive impacts on eels.87

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

80. Eric Feunteun, Management and Restoration of European Eel Population
(Anguilla anguilla): An Impossible Bargain, 18 ECOLOGICAL ENGINEERING
575, 579 (2002).
François Lefebvre et al., On the Origin of Anguillicoloides crassus, The Invasive Nematode of Anguillid Eels, 7 AQUATIC INVASIONS 443 (2012).
Géraldine Fazio et al., Swim Bladder Nematodes (Anguillicoloides crassus)
Disturb Silvering in European Eels (Anguilla anguilla), 98 J. PARASITOLOGY
695, 695 (Sept. 7, 2012).
Id.
Arjan P. Palstra et al., Swimming Performance of Silver Eels is Severely Impaired by the Swim-Bladder Parasite Anguillicola crassus, 352 J.
EXPERIMENTAL MARINE BIOLOGY & ECOLOGY 244, 245 (2007).
Id. at 245, 252.
N.B. Sjöberg et al., Effects of the Swimbladder Parasite Anguillicola crassus
on the Migration of European Silver Eels Anguilla anguilla in the Baltic Sea,
74 J. FISH BIOLOGY 2158, 2166 (2009).
Fazio et al., supra note 82, at 703.
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Pollution and Climate Change

European eels require stores of fat to make the long migration
from their continental freshwater habitats to the Sargasso Sea.88
Consequently, they may be more susceptible to bioaccumulation of
pollutants.89 Researchers have found that accumulation of lipophilic chemical pollutants, such as polychlorinated biphenyls
(“PCBs”), in maturing eels could have potentially toxic effects on
the survival period of the fertilized eggs.90 In addition, because
these pollutants are stored by the fish and released when fat stores
are broken down during migration, they could impair the ability of
silver eels to complete their spawning migrations.91
Climate change may also affect the abundance of European
eels by changing oceanic conditions on which the eels depend to
drift to near-shore habitat.92 Such changes could impact breeding
grounds in the Sargasso Sea and alter the recruitment of glass eels
to near-shore and freshwater environments.93 Climate change is
also increasingly affecting and reducing freshwater habitats due to
drought.94 Scientists are quick to caution that climatic changes
and associated changes in oceanic conditions also occur naturally
and have influenced eel populations for millennia.95 However, potential climate impacts, when combined with the other impacts described in this section, are new. Thus, the exact influence of climate
change on the European eel remains speculative.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Vincent J.T. van Ginneken & Guido E.E.J.M. van den Thillart, Physiology: Eel Fat Stores Are Enough to Reach the Sargasso, 403 NATURE 156, 156–
57 (2000).
Gollock, supra note 59, at 10.
Arjan P. Palstra et al., Are Dioxin-like Contaminants Responsible for the Eel
(Anguilla anguilla) Drama?, 93 NATURWISSENSCHAFTEN 145, 148 (2006).
Tony T. Robinet & Eric E. Feunteun, Sublethal Effects of Exposure to Chemical Compounds: A Cause for the Decline in Atlantic Eels?, 11
ECOTOXICOLOGY 265, 272 (2002).
JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 12–13.
Id.
Personal Communication with Gollock, supra note 58.
Id.
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III. THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
A diversity of habitats, threats, management strategies, data
collection efforts, and other factors all suggest that multilateral efforts to conserve the European eel are needed. A variety of regional
and international agreements have adopted or could adopt
measures to conserve and manage European eels. However, for the
reasons discussed below, they are inadequate to meet the challenges facing the European eel. Consequently, the European eel
would benefit from an international agreement focused solely on
the European eel.
Some species, due to their life history characteristics or the
numerous threats they face, fall through the cracks of international law.96 Due to the life history traits of highly migratory species such as tunas, cetaceans, and albatrosses, these species swim
or fly in and out of the inland waters, territorial seas, and exclusive
economic zones of a number of coastal States, as well as the high
seas.97 Consequently, national legislation or treaties with a limited
geographic scope will be inadequate to provide management and
conservation measures throughout such a species’ range, and,
thus, are likely to be ineffective.
Species facing numerous threats encounter different problems. Many treaties lack the comprehensive scope necessary to address multiple threats. CITES, for example, may help regulate and
monitor international trade in specimens of a species, but it does
not have the authority to protect that species from domestic trade
or habitat destruction.98
The European eel exemplifies both of these challenges. With
57 Range States and territories,99 individual efforts to manage and
conserve the European eel are unlikely to be effective. Moreover,

96.
97.
98.
99.

See Chris Wold, World Heritage Species: A New Legal Approach to Conservation, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 337, 339–42 (2008).
See, e.g., Dale W. Rice & Karl W. Kenyon, Breeding Distribution, History,
and Populations of North Pacific Albatrosses, 79 THE AUK 365 (1962) (describing the distribution and life history of various albatrosses).
CITES, supra note 14, at art. XIV(1).
For a list of the States and territories, see supra note 35.
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scientists are not sure if all parts of the breeding population contribute to reproduction;100 consequently, “since any part of the continental stock might be essential to the overall status of the stock,
all parts must be protected at least to the minimum acceptable
level . . . whatever that level is.”101 Even regional law, such as the
EU Eel Regulation, is inadequate because the European eel’s range
extends outside the territories of EU Member States to include
North African countries as well as non-EU European countries and
territories, such as Norway, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands.102
Moreover, the European eel’s spawning habitat occurs in the Sargasso Sea,103 part of which lies beyond the jurisdiction of any State.
In fact, the status of the European eel has not improved and mortality of the eel has not declined appreciably since EU Member
States began developing EMPs pursuant to the EU regulation.104
The EU itself recognizes that eel management requires more attention due to the range of threats to the eel from fishing as well
as dams and other barriers to migration, habitat loss or degradation, pollution, diseases, and parasites.105 However, EU Member
States cannot address these threats alone. Threats such as pollution clearly require a multilateral response.
At the international level, no organization or treaty has legal
competence to address the suite of threats faced by the European
eel throughout its range. Several regional fisheries management
organizations (“RFMOs”) might have some authority to manage
the European eel, but their geographical scope, membership, or
management authority is inadequate to meaningfully protect the
eel. For example, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization

100.
101.
102.
103.

REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON EELS AND CITES, supra note 36, at 33.
Id.
See supra note 35.
See, e.g., INT’L COUNCIL FOR THE EXPL. OF THE SEA, REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON EELS (WGEEL) 6 (2016), https://perma.cc/AQ8W-WRDU [hereinafter 2016 WGEEL REPORT].
104. Dekker, supra note 20, at 2443.
105. Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
the Outcome of the Implementation of the Eel Management Plans, including
an Evaluation of the Measures concerning Restocking and of the Evolution
of Market Prices for Eels Less Than 12 cm in Length, at 8, COM (2014) 640
final (Oct. 21, 2014), https://perma.cc/C4TZ-CLNX [hereinafter Eel Implementation Report].
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(“NAFO”)106 applies its Conservation Measures only in areas beyond national jurisdiction.107 The General Fisheries Commission
for the Mediterranean (“GFCM”)108 has competence only with respect to fisheries of the Mediterranean and Black Seas.109 The Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic
Sea110 has broad jurisdiction to address pollution111 and promote
ecological restoration,112 but its geographic scope is limited to the
Baltic Sea.113
The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (“ICCAT”)114 covers the entire Atlantic Ocean, but it does
not have the authority to address direct harvest of eels or protect
freshwater habitats; it may manage only tuna and tuna-like species and those fish caught while fishing for tuna.115 The area of
106. NAFO is established by the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation
in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. See Convention on Future Multilateral
Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Oct. 24, 1978, 1135
U.N.T.S. 369 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1979), https://perma.cc/69R8-CFHK
[hereinafter NAFO Convention].
107. The NAFO Convention defines both a “Convention Area,” which includes
areas under national jurisdiction, and a “Regulatory Area,” which does not.
Id. at art. I(1)–(2). NAFO applies its conservation measures only to the Regulatory Area: “The [2017 Conservation and Enforcement Measures] shall,
unless otherwise provided, apply to all fishing vessels used or intended for
use for the purposes of commercial fishing activities conducted on fisheries
resources in the Regulatory Area.” NAFO, Conservation and Enforcement
Measures, at art. 2(1), FC Doc. 17-01 (2017), https://perma.cc/PL4F-JKHG.
108. The General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (“GFCM”) was
established under the provisions of Article XIV of the FAO Constitution. See
Agreement for the Establishment of the General Fisheries Commission for
the Mediterranean, Preamble, https://perma.cc/6R4B-66N4; General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM), FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE
U.N., https://perma.cc/A6Y7-TJ65. (entered into force Feb. 20 1952).
109. See Agreement for the Establishment of the General Fisheries Commission
for the Mediterranean, supra note 108, at arts. 3–4.
110. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea,
Apr. 9, 1992 (entered into force Jan. 17, 2000), https://perma.cc/TJ66-VB4L.
This convention is more frequently referred to as the Helsinki Convention
and its commission as HELCOM.
111. Id. at arts. 3, 5, 6, 8, 11.
112. Id. at arts. 3, 15.
113. Id. at arts. 1, 4(1).
114. ICCAT was established by the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. See International Convention for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas, May 14, 1966, 20 U.S.T. 2887, annex I, at 5,
https://perma.cc/X7YT-V55K [hereinafter ICCAT].
115. ICCAT provides:
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competence of the Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission
(“WECAFC”) includes the Sargasso Sea,116 but it has no management authority,117 and its jurisdictional scope, like the other
RFMOs, does not extend to the freshwater rivers where eels spend
a significant part of their life history and where most eels are captured for trade.118
Other treaties have taken steps to protect European eels, but
they do not cover the spectrum of threats facing European eels.
CITES, for example, has included the European eel in Appendix
II.119 Consequently, Parties must issue export permits that verify
that the trade will not be detrimental to the survival of the species
and that the eels were legally acquired.120 CITES does not, however, have the authority to issue rules to protect the eel’s spawning
habitat in the Sargasso Sea, require fish ladders to allow eels to
migrate past dams, or otherwise adopt habitat conservation

116.

117.
118.
119.
120.

In order to carry out the objectives of this Convention the Commission
shall be responsible for the study of the populations of tuna and tunalike fishes (the Scombriformes with the exception of the families
Trichiuridae and Gempylidae and the genus Scomber) and such other
species of fishes exploited in tuna fishing in the Convention area as
are not under investigation by another international fishery organization.
Id. at annex I, at art. IV(1).
The WECAFC area of competence includes all marine waters of the Western
Central Atlantic bounded by a line drawn as follows:
From a point on the coast of South America at 5° 00’ N latitude in a
northerly direction along this coast past the Atlantic entry to the Panama Canal; thence continue along the coasts of Central and North
America to a point on this coast at 35° 00’ N latitude; thence due east
along this parallel to 42°00’ W longitude; thence due north along this
meridian to 36° 00’ N latitude; thence due east along this parallel to
40°00’ W longitude; thence due south along this meridian to 5° 00’ N
latitude; thence due west along this parallel to the original point at 5°
00’ N latitude on the coast of South America.
FAO Res. 4/61, Establishment of the Western and Central Atlantic Fishery
Commission, ¶ 1, https://perma.cc/8LXH-2VKD.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 1.
CITES Appendix II, supra note 15.
CITES, supra note 14, at art. IV(2). Similar permit rules relating to “introduction from the sea” may apply if the species is taken in the marine environment not under the jurisdiction of any State. Id. at art. IV(6); CITES Res.
Conf. 14.6 (Rev. CoP16), Introduction from the Sea, annex III(1) (June 2017),
https://perma.cc/NYF6-UANB.
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measures. The present Appendix II listing under CMS121 does not
require Parties to undertake any conservation activities,122 even
though the scope of CMS allows it to address habitat, trade, and
other threats.123 Appendix II species receive protection under CMS
only after development of a separate “Agreement.”124
Other factors show the weakness of current legal regimes to
conserve the European eel. For example, after the EU closed its
borders to exports of European eels, exports of the American eel
increased to meet demand in Asia.125 Exports of other eel species
also increased in response to declining Japanese eel populations
and to the EU’s prohibition against exports of European eels.126
In addition, management of European eels has typically taken
place at the local level, although with the enactment of the European Eel Regulation, some level of national oversight now takes
place.127 Nonetheless, management across the EU and the larger
eel range remains uncoordinated,128 and the conservation status of
the European eel continues to be of great concern.129 Local management is unlikely to take into account stock-wide conservation of
eels and more likely to respond to local constituent desires.130 Perhaps consistent with local management, countries in the Mediterranean Sea region have, over time, developed different methods for
gathering catch composition and effort data,131 making efforts by
scientists to assess the status of the European eel more difficult.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

CMS Appendix II, supra note 19.
See CMS, supra note 18, at art. IV.
Id. at art. V.
Id. at arts. IV–V.
Sneed, supra note 6.
Jacoby et al., supra note 8, at 326 (noting increases in exports of the Indian
shortfin eel (A. bicolor) from the Philippines).
Dekker, supra note 20, at 2445.
Steps are being taken to coordinate efforts, for example, by the GFCM in the
WGEEL, but this is a recent development. Personal Communication with
Gollock, supra note 58.
Dekker, supra note 20, at 2445 (stating that “[t]he historical decline of the
stock indicates that uncoordinated actions by local managers alone could not
sustain the stock”).
Id. at 2445–46.
2015 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 87–88; Dekker, supra note 20, at
2445.
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IV. CMS INSTRUMENTS
As described above, the conservation of the European eel
would benefit from international management. With an international agreement, reporting of scientific information could be
standardized or data collection harmonized; scientific needs and
priorities could be determined on a region-wide basis; scientific
analysis of relevant information could be channeled towards policymaking across the eel’s range; and local management efforts
could be informed by stock-wide assessments and conservation
needs with local efforts also informing those stock-wide assessments. Moreover, the possibility for stakeholder involvement in eel
management, which to date “has varied from country to country,”132 could be assured.
At the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, participants generally agreed that an international instrument would
benefit the conservation status of the European eel and that CMS
could play a role in developing that instrument.133 The CMS Parties later agreed that a second Range States meeting should explore how to “solidify the role of CMS” in European eel conservation.134 Indeed, CMS, with the possibility for legally binding and
non-legally binding instruments, provides an opportunity to coordinate eel conservation efforts. Using CMS has several advantages
over other fora:
1. CMS already has a Secretariat that can organize negotiations;135
2. CMS has included the European eel in Appendix II,
thereby recognizing the need for an international legal instrument to improve the conservation status of the species;136
3. CMS legal instruments have the capacity to address the
full range of threats facing the European eel;137
132. Dekker, supra note 20, at 2447.
133. Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, supra note
24, ¶ 70. Some participants did question the need for an international legal
instrument. Id. ¶ 36 (statement of Evangelia Georgitsi, Directorate General
of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the European Commission (DG-Mare)).
134. CMS Concerted Action on the European Eel, supra note 28, at 1.
135. CMS, supra note 18, at art. VII(2).
136. Id. at art. IV.
137. Id. at art. V(4).
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4. CMS legal instruments have the capacity to address
threats and management concerns throughout the eel’s
range, including in both freshwater and marine environments, as well as on the high seas;138 and
5. CMS instruments can involve CMS Parties and non-Parties.139
CMS offers different options for a legal instrument to protect
and conserve the European eel. Section A describes the principal
options, while Section B assesses their similarities and differences.
A.

Legally Binding and Non-Legally Binding CMS
Instruments

CMS includes two provisions for developing new legal instruments for species included in Appendix II. Article IV(3) refers to
“AGREEMENTS,” while Article IV(4) refers to “agreements.” Collectively, AGREEMENTS and agreements are referred to as “Agreements” with an uppercase “A.”140
Article IV(3) requires Parties that are Range States of migratory species listed in Appendix II to endeavor to conclude
“AGREEMENTS” where these should benefit the species. They
should give priority to those species with an unfavorable conservation status.141 Article IV(4) encourages Parties to take action with
a view to concluding “agreements” for any population or geographically separate part of the population of any species or lower taxon of
wild animals, members of which periodically cross one or more national jurisdiction boundaries.
AGREEMENTS and agreements differ in important ways. Unlike AGREEMENTS, which expressly apply only to species included
in Appendix II, agreements may include species not included in CMS
138. Id. at art. V(2).
139. Id.
140. CMS Res 12.8, Implementation of Articles IV and V of the Convention, Doc.
UNEP/CMS/Res. 12.8, at 1 (Oct. 2017), https://perma.cc/M635-8XRM (“Noting that colloquially, and in this Resolution, the term ‘Agreements’ is used
to refer in a generic sense to AGREEMENTS, agreements and Memoranda
of Understanding as the context may require.”) (emphasis in original).
141. Appendix II includes migratory species that (1) “have an unfavourable conservation status and which require international agreements for their conservation and management”; and (2) those that “have a conservation status which
would significantly benefit from the international co-operation that could be
achieved by an international agreement.” CMS, supra note 18, at art. IV(1).

21

2018]

Bringing the European Eel Back from the Brink

189

Appendix II. In addition, agreements may include species that are
not migratory within the meaning of CMS. CMS defines “migratory
species” to mean “the entire population or any geographically separate part of the population of any species or lower taxon of wild animals, a significant proportion of whose members cyclically and predictably cross one or more national jurisdictional boundaries.”142 In
contrast, species covered by an agreement need only “periodically
cross one or more national jurisdictional boundaries.”143 In short, Article IV(4) covers a broader range of species than Article IV(3). A European Eel Agreement could fall within either provision.
CMS itself does not specify whether Article IV(3)
AGREEMENTS and Article IV(4) agreements should be legally binding.144 Early in the Convention’s history, however, the Parties
adopted resolutions that distinguished AGREEMENTS from agreements. In 1988 in Resolution 2.6, for example, the Parties suggested
that agreements could take the form of resolutions, administrative
agreements, or memoranda of understanding.145 Because resolutions of the Parties are non-binding, the implication was that agreements under Article IV(4) could be, but were not required to be, nonbinding. The unstated corollary was that Article IV(3)
AGREEMENTS would be legally binding. Resolution 2.6 further
supports this interpretation by suggesting a progression; an agreement under Article IV(4) could be a “first step” towards conclusion of
an AGREEMENT under Article IV(3).146 A two-step process would

142. Id. at art. I(1)(a) (emphasis added).
143. Id. at art. IV(4) (emphasis added).
144. For a review of the negotiating history concerning Articles IV(3) and (4), see
Chris Wold, A History of “AGREEMENTS” under Article IV.3 and “agreements” under Article IV.4 in the Convention on Migratory Species, Doc.
UNEP/CMS/COP11/Inf.31 (Sept. 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/S44N-Y6NA.
145. CMS Res. 2.6, Implementation of Articles IV and V of the Convention, Doc.
UNEP/CMS/Res. 2.6, ¶ 3 (Oct. 14, 1988), https://perma.cc/9TLD-XSVT. The
Parties consolidated Resolution 2.6 with other resolutions relating to implementation of Agreements in Resolution 12.8. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140.
146. CMS Res. 2.6, supra note 145, ¶ 2. Later the Parties decided that agreements could be a first step toward an AGREEMENT “in some cases” but that
in other cases “this may not be appropriate.” CMS Res. 3.5, Implementation
of Article IV, Paragraph 4, of the Convention Concerning AGREEMENTS,
Doc. UNEP/CMS/Res. 3.5, ¶ 4 (Sept. 13, 1991), https://perma.cc/9YH8UR8E. The Parties consolidated Resolution 3.5 with other resolutions relating to implementation of Agreements in Resolution 12.8. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140.
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not be necessary unless the steps included some distinction in their
legal status.
Subsequently, CMS Parties, along with non-Parties in some
cases, developed and brought into force seven legally binding Agreements.147 Four of these Agreements were developed under Article
IV(3),148 while the other three were developed under Article IV(4).149
Each participating State consented to be bound by these Agreements
only after engaging its domestic processes for ratifying or acceding to
the Agreement, and the Agreement entered into force only after the
requisite number of States ratified or acceded to the Agreement.150
The Parties have also developed nineteen Memoranda of Understanding.151 Each of these agreements specifies that they were developed under Article IV(4) and are non-binding.152 Unlike legally
147. Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and Their Habitats, Oct. 26, 2007,
2545 U.N.T.S. 55 [hereinafter Gorilla Agreement]; Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels, June 19, 2001, 2258 U.N.T.S. 257 (entered into force Feb. 1, 2004) [hereinafter ACAP]; Agreement on AfricanEurasian Migratory Waterbirds, Aug. 15, 1996, 2365 U.N.T.S. 203 (entered
into force Nov. 1, 1999) [hereinafter AEWA]; Agreement on the Conservation
of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic
Area, Nov. 24, 1996, 2183 U.N.T.S. 303 (entered into force June 1, 2001)
[hereinafter ACCOBAMS]; [hereinafter EUROBATS]; Agreement on the
Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas, Mar. 17,
1992, 1772 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Mar. 29, 1994) [hereinafter
ASCOBANS]; Agreement on the Conservation of Bats in Europe, Dec. 4,
1991, 1863 U.N.T.S. 101 (entered into force Jan. 16, 1994) [hereinafter
EUROBATS]; Agreement on the Conservation of Seals in the Wadden Sea,
Oct. 16, 1990, 2719 U.N.T.S. 263 (entered into force Oct. 1, 1991) [hereinafter Wadden Sea Seals].
148. See, e.g., ACAP, supra note 147, at art. I(5) (“This Agreement is an
AGREEMENT within the meaning of Article IV (3) of the Convention[on
Migratory Species].”); AEWA, supra note 147, at art. I(3) (“This Agreement
is an AGREEMENT within the meaning of Article IV, paragraph 3, of the
Convention [on Migratory Species].”). See also Gorilla Agreement, supra
note 147, at art. I(4); EUROBATS, supra note 147, at art. II(1).
149. ACCOBAMS, supra note 147, at art. I(4) (“This Agreement is an agreement
within the meaning of Article IV, paragraph 4, of the Convention.”);
ASCOBANS, supra note 147, at art. 8.1; Wadden Sea Seals, supra note 147,
at art. I.
150. See, e.g., ACAP, supra note 147, at arts. XV–XVI (describing the provisions
for signature, ratification, accession, and entry into force).
151. Links to all of these agreements can be found at Memoranda of Understanding, CMS, https://perma.cc/3YFP-4DVR.
152. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding for the Conservation of Cetaceans
and Their Habitat in the Pacific Islands Region, Doc. UNEP/CMS/PIC1/Inf/3, ¶ 9 (opened for signature Sept. 15, 2006) (entered into force Sept. 15,
2006), https://perma.cc/TG3P-2WJL [hereinafter Pacific Islands Cetaceans
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binding Agreements, non-legally binding agreements do not need to
go through a State’s ratification process. Instead, upon the signature
of a designated individual, such as the Minister of Environment, a
State becomes a “Signatory” to the MOU and agrees to implement it.
B. Similarities and Differences
Legally binding and non-legally binding CMS Agreements
(that is, both AGREEMENTS and agreements) share many similarities, but they also differ in important ways (aside from their
legal status). The most important similarity is that they all include
substantive conservation actions for Parties/Signatories to undertake to protect the migratory species subject to the Agreement. In
fact, the primary purpose of all Agreements is “to restore the migratory species concerned to a favourable conservation status or to
maintain it in such a status.”153 Agreements frequently implement
this goal through an Action Plan.154 These conservation provisions
and Action Plans usually apply throughout the range of the concerned species, including, where applicable, on the high seas. The
Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels
(“ACAP”), for example, applies to listed albatrosses and petrels
throughout their range, which is defined as “all the areas of land
or water that any albatross or petrel inhabits, stays in temporarily,
crosses, or over-flies at any time on its normal migration routes.”155

MOU] (“This Memorandum of Understanding is an agreement under Article
IV, paragraph 4, of CMS and is not legally binding.”).
153. CMS, supra note 18, at art. V(1) (for AGREEMENTS); CMS Res. 12.8, supra
note 140, ¶ 3 (for agreements).
154. See, e.g., ACAP, supra note 147, at annex 2(2) (establishing provisions for
habitat conservation and restoration); Memorandum of Understanding on
the Conservation and Management of Marine Turtles and their Habitats of
the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia, at Conservation and Management
Plan (opened for signature June 23, 2001) (entered into force Sept. 1, 2001),
https://perma.cc/C2HK-MASE [hereinafter IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU].
155. ACAP, supra note 147, at arts. I(1), I(2)(i). Similarly, the Pacific Islands Cetaceans MOU applies to a signatory’s nationals and vessels, without geographic limit. Pacific Islands Cetaceans MOU, supra note 152, ¶ 11. Agreements do not always cover the entire range of the species. AEWA, for
example, does not cover the entire range of all waters it covers; it defines
“waterbirds” to mean “those species of birds that are ecologically dependent
on wetlands for at least part of their annual cycle, have a range which lies
entirely or partly within the Agreement Area and are listed in Annex 2 to this
Agreement.” AEWA, supra note 147, at art. I(2)(c) (emphasis added).
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The application of an Agreement to the high seas, as with
ACAP, is consistent with CMS, which provides that Agreements
“should cover the whole of the range of the migratory species concerned . . . .”156 CMS further defines “habitat” and “range” without
reference to national jurisdiction,157 and defines “Range State” to
include those State’s whose vessels “take”158 migratory species on
the high seas.159 The conservation plan for ACAP, for example, includes provisions to protect land-based breeding sites of albatrosses and petrels,160 and the marine habitat of these species.161
Similarly, the Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of Marine Turtles and their Habitats of the
Indian Ocean and South-East Asia (“IOSEA Marine Turtles
MOU”) calls on Signatories to manage and regulate beaches where
sea turtles nest162 and to take action to protect high seas turtle
habitat.163
Most, if not all, Agreements, regardless of whether they are
legally binding or not, also include the following provisions:
• Submission of reports by Parties/Signatories on implementation of the Agreement;164
156. CMS, supra note 18, at art. V(2) (for AGREEMENTS); CMS Res. 12.8, supra
note 140, ¶ 4 (for agreements).
157. CMS, supra note 18, at art. I(1)(f)–(g).
158. CMS defines “taking” to mean “taking, hunting, fishing, capturing, harassing,
deliberate killing, or attempting to engage in any such conduct.” Id. at art.
I(1)(i).
159. CMS defines “Range State” as follows:
“Range State” in relation to a particular migratory species means any
State (and where appropriate any other Party referred to under subparagraph (k) of this paragraph) that exercises jurisdiction over any
part of the range of that migratory species, or a State, flag vessels of
which are engaged outside national jurisdictional limits in taking that
migratory species.
Id. at art. I(1)(h).
160. ACAP, supra note 147, at annex 2, ¶ 2.2.1.
161. Id. at annex 2, ¶ 2.3.
162. IOSEA Martine Turtles MOU, supra note 154, at Conservation and Management Plan, Objective 2.
163. Id. at Conservation and Management Plan, Objectives 1.4, 5.3.
164. See, e.g., AEWA, supra note 147, at art. IV(1)(c); ACCOBAMS, supra note
147, at art. VIII(b); IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, supra note 154, at “Actions,” ¶ 8; Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Migratory Sharks, Doc. CMS/Sharks/MOS1/Inf.1, ¶ 15(b) (opened for signature
Feb. 12, 2010), (entered into force Mar. 2010)https://perma.cc/3Q24-LXUJ
[hereinafter Sharks MOU].
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Review by the Parties/Signatories of implementation at
meetings of participating States;165
Establishment or designation of a Secretariat to organize
meetings and undertake other administrative services;166
Financial arrangements for the Agreement;167
A grant of authority to the Parties to a legally binding
Agreement or Signatories to a non-legally binding agreement to interpret the Agreement by adopting resolutions
and, where relevant, add new species to the list of covered
species;168 and
Establishment of a scientific or technical committee to
provide relevant scientific or other information and advice
to the Agreement’s decision-making body,169 although
they may be designed differently depending on the needs
of the Agreement.170

165. See, e.g., AEWA, supra note 147, at art. VI(8)(b); ACCOBAMS, supra note
147, at art. III(8)(b); IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, supra note 154, at “Basic
Principles,” ¶ 3; Sharks MOU, supra note 164, ¶ 20.
166. See, e.g., AEWA, supra note 147, at art. VI(7)(b); ACCOBAMS, supra note
147, at art. IV(1)–(2); IOSEA Martine Turtles MOU, supra note 147, at “Actions,” ¶ 5; Sharks MOU, supra note 163, ¶ 27(a).
167. See, e.g., AEWA, supra note 147, at art. VI(8)(c); ACCOBAMS, supra note
147, at art. III(8)(e); IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, supra note 154, at “Actions,” ¶ 9; Sharks MOU, supra note 164, ¶¶ 16–17.
168. See, e.g., ACAP, supra note 147, at art. VIII(13)(c), (e); AEWA, supra note
147, at art. VI(9); ACCOBAMS, supra note 147, at art. VII(3)(b)–(c); IOSEA
Marine Turtles MOU, supra note 154, at “Actions,” ¶¶ 3–4; Sharks MOU,
supra note 164, ¶¶ 20, 33.
169. See, e.g., ACAP, supra note 147, at arts. IX(1), (6)(a)–(c); ACCOBAMS, supra
note 147, at arts. III(8)(c), VII; IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, supra note 154,
at “Actions,” ¶ 6; Sharks MOU, supra note 164, ¶ 24.
170. See, e.g., Gorilla Agreement, supra note 147, at art. VI (establishing a Technical Committee); ACAP, supra note 147, at art. IX(1) (establishing an Advisory Committee); AEWA supra note 147, at art. VII(3) (establishing a
Technical Committee); ACCOBAMS, supra note 147, at art. VII(1) (establishing a Scientific Committee); ASCOBANS, supra note 147, at art. 5.1 (establishing an Advisory Committee). However, some MOUs, particularly the
earlier ones, receive scientific advice from the CMS Scientific Council. Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for the Eastern Atlantic Populations of the Mediterranean Monk Seal (Monachus monachus), ¶ 4 (Oct. 18, 2007), https://perma.cc/S4RA-3B9N [hereinafter
Mediterranean Monk Seal MOU] (nominating the Atlantic Seal Working
Group); Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures
for the West African Populations of the African Elephant (Loxodonta africana), ¶ 4 (Nov. 22, 2005), https://perma.cc/Q75T-GD7B [hereinafter West
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Despite these numerous similarities, key differences exist. Legally binding Agreements, whether established under Article IV(3)
or IV(4), take longer to enter into force because of the need to engage a State’s domestic legal processes for ratification or accession.
ACAP took more than two-and-a-half years to enter into force,171
the African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbird Agreement (“AEWA”)
more than three years,172 and the Agreement on the Conservation
of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous
Atlantic Area (“ACCOBAMS”) roughly 4.5 years.173
In contrast, MOUs typically commence more quickly. Even geographically large, marine MOUs commenced on the day that they
opened for signature. The Memorandum of Understanding on the
Conservation of Migratory Sharks (“Sharks MOU”), for example,
obtained the 10 signatories needed to operationalize the MOU on
the same day it opened for signature,174 as did the Memorandum
of Understanding for the Conservation of Cetaceans and their Habitats in the Pacific Island Region (“Pacific Cetaceans MOU”).175
The legally binding Agreements also tend to have their own
Secretariats, although this is not universal. ACCOBAMS, Wadden
Sea Seals, and ACAP each have a fully independent Secretariat
with offices separate from the CMS Secretariat in Bonn.176 AEWA
and the Agreement on the Conservation of Populations of European Bats (“EUROBATS”) have largely independent Secretariats,

African Elephants MOU] (nominating the IUCN African Elephant Specialist Group).
171. ACAP was opened for signature on June 19, 2001, and entered into force on
February 1, 2004. ACAP, CMS, https://perma.cc/4S5D-WWDY.
172. AEWA was opened for signature on August 15, 1996, and entered into force
on November 1, 1999. AEWA, CMS, https://perma.cc/HTC8-CVJ6.
173. ACCOBAMS was signed on November 24, 1996, and entered in force on June
1, 2001. ACCOBAMS, CMS, https://perma.cc/BCS6-YXKM.
174. The Sharks MOU entered into force 30 days after receiving the requisite 10
signatures. See Sharks MOU, supra note 164, at 9.
175. The Pacific Islands Cetaceans MOU required four signatories to commence;
seven signed on the first day. Pacific Cetaceans MOU, supra note 152, ¶ 12.
176. Robert Lee et al., Review of the Current Organization and Activities of CMS
and the CMS Family
First
Step
of
the
Inter-Sessional
Future
Shape
Process,
Doc.
UNEP/CMS/Inf.10.14.8, ¶ 16 (Jan. 1, 2010), https://perma.cc/AU9E-SJH2.

27

2018]

Bringing the European Eel Back from the Brink

195

but they are housed with the CMS Secretariat and share some administrative and other tasks.177 The Secretariat of the Agreement
on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North East
Atlantic, Irish and North Seas (“ASCOBANS”) has been subsumed
within the CMS Secretariat, and the CMS Secretariat is also the
Secretariat for the Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and
Their Habitats (“Gorilla Agreement”).178 AEWA, ASCOBANS,
EUROBATS, and the Gorilla Agreement are integrated within
United Nations Environment (formerly known as the United Nations Environment Programme).179
Many of the MOUs are administered by the CMS Secretariat,
and none has an independent secretariat. In some cases, however,
the CMS Secretariat receives support for technical coordination
services from a nongovernmental organization.180 In two cases
(Ruddy-headed Goose and Huemel MOUs), the two Signatories
(Argentina and Chile) coordinate among themselves; they function
independently of the CMS Secretariat.181 The Signatories to three
other MOUs (Monk Seal, Grassland Birds, and High Andean Flamingos) perform most of the coordination work and operate “relatively independently” of the Secretariat.182 Each of these three
MOUs has just four or five Signatories, making coordination relatively simple compared to Agreements with many more Parties or
Signatories.
CMS Agreements also differ in the number of working languages that they use. ACCOBAMS works in English and

177. CMS, Report of Resolution 11.3, Enhancing Synergies and Sharing Common
Services among CMS Family Instruments, UNEP/CMS/COP12/Doc.16.1
(2017), https://perma.cc/KHM6-YL4N.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. The Saiga Antelope, Siberian Crane, Aquatic Warbler, and Pacific Cetaceans MOUs receive technical coordination services from NGOs. CMS, An
Assessment
of
MOUs
and
Their
Viability,
Doc.
UNEP/CMS/COP11/Doc.22.3, at 21 (Aug. 14, 2014), https://perma.cc/579JTYTM [hereinafter CMS Assessment of MOUs].
181. Id. at 22.
182. Id. at 23.
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French;183 ASCOBANS works primarily in English, but also provides translations of some documents in other languages;184 AEWA
works in two languages (French and English);185 ACAP in three
(French, English, and Spanish); and EUROBATS in one (English).186 Similarly, MOUs differ in the number of languages used.
For example, the Sharks MOU uses three (English, Spanish, and
French),187 while the Pacific Cetaceans MOU uses two (English
and French).188 The IOSEA Marine Turtles and Dugong MOUs use
only English.189
Importantly, the number of working languages chosen and the
choice of administrative structures for locating and hosting a Secretariat are not dependent on whether an Agreement is binding.
These are negotiable items. That said, the costs of operating an
Agreement rise substantially with the number of working languages due to the need for interpretation and translation.
C. Conservation Outcomes of Legally Binding and
Non-Legally Binding Agreements
In 2008, the CMS Secretariat undertook an analysis of the 19
MOUs and the Gorilla Agreement to determine which factors led

183. ACCOBAMS, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE MEETING OF THE PARTIES at Rule
21(1), https://perma.cc/5STK-D97Q.
184. See, e.g., Eighth Meeting of the Parties, ASCOBANS, https://perma.cc/55LT6AMB (showing meeting documents only in English). The treaty provides
that English, French, German, and Russian are equally authentic, but, as
noted, the parties only conduct meetings in one language. ASCOBANS, supra note 147, at art. 8.7.
185. See 6th Session of the Meeting of the Parties to AEWA, AEWA,
https://perma.cc/T2SS-CKJT (showing translation of meeting documents
into English and French only). AEWA has four official languages, however:
Arabic, English, French, and Russian. AEWA, supra note 147, at art.
XVII(1).
186. EUROBATS, RULES OF PROCEDURE at Rule 17, https://perma.cc/396STPWN.
187. Sharks MOU, supra note 164, ¶ 34.
188. Pacific Cetaceans MOU, supra note 152, ¶ 16.
189. Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of
Dugongs (Dugong dugon) and Their Habitats throughout Their Range, Doc.
CMS/DUGONG/Inf.5, ¶ 19 (Oct. 31, 2007), https://perma.cc/3A6H-BLS5
[hereinafter Dugong MOU]; IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, Doc. CMS/MTAFR.1/Inf.7, at 5 (June 23, 2001), https://perma.cc/VL43-8GZR.
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to successful performance of MOUs.190 The Secretariat concluded
that MOUs were more likely to be viable when:
• the Signatories are willing and able to run it themselves
(the number of Signatories must be small);
• there is a strong engagement from the stakeholders in the
MOU and some modest and regular funding to assist
them; or
• significant funding to staff a functional Secretariat is
available.191
The second point—the active engagement of one of more nonState actors—appears particularly relevant to the success of an
MOU. The CMS Secretariat concluded:
The total number of stakeholders is . . . not the important factor.
As for the case of Saiga Antelope, the Aquatic Warbler and IOSEA,
the total number of stakeholders is rather low, but all of them are
actively engaged and participate in the MOU, suggesting the MOU
is central to the wider conservation effort.192

Later in its assessment, the Secretariat concluded:
[W]ith the Bukhara Deer MOU, there has been little engagement
from the Secretariat over the years, but one committed NGO
(WWF Russia) uses the MOU and its Action Plan to engage with
the relevant governments in existing fora, and ensures conservation actions are being implemented.193

Perhaps surprisingly, the legal status of the Agreement “does
not appear to be a matter of great significance.”194 Consistent with
the Secretariat’s conclusions, the authors of a paper that reviewed
implementation of CMS Agreements concluded that stable, core
funding is more important.195 Those CMS Agreements with stable,

190. See generally CMS Assessment of MOUs, supra note 180. The Parties asked
for the analysis in CMS Res. 10.09, Future Structure and Strategies of
the CMS and CMS Family, Doc. UNEP/CMS/Res. 10.09, annex 1, at Activity 5 (Nov. 20–25, 2011), https://perma.cc/96DK-JCC2.
191. CMS Assessment of MOUs, supra note 180, at 39.
192. Id. at 31.
193. Id. at 36.
194. Lee et al., supra note 176, ¶ 255.
195. Id.
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core funding are able to pursue their conservation agenda confidently, unlike MOUs relying “exclusively on voluntary contributions that could be withdrawn or not materialize at any time.”196
Despite this conclusion, legally binding Agreements appear to
provide more stable funding because they have their own core
budgets; Parties perhaps view their contributions to legally binding Agreements differently from their contributions to MOUs,
which are specified as “voluntary.”197
V.

SHOULD CMS PURSUE A CMS LEGAL
INSTRUMENT FOR EELS?

Despite the Convention’s provisions for the development of
Agreements, the CMS Parties have evolved their thinking about
their value. In 2008, the CMS Parties noted the challenges associated with the proliferation of CMS Agreements, in particular the
financial and staff resources needed to administer and operationalize them effectively.198 Consequently, the Parties adopted criteria for evaluating proposals for new Agreements at the Eleventh
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (“COP”).199 When evaluating proposals for future Agreements, the CMS Secretariat and
196. Id.
197. Id. at annex I, tbl.35.
198. CMS Res. 9.13, Intersessional Process Regarding the Future Shape of CMS,
UNEP/CMS/Res. 9.13, preamble para. 9 (Dec. 1–8, 2008) (acknowledging
that the growth in Agreements creates “new challenges” for CMS that requires “in-depth consideration”), https://perma.cc/P63W-LH7J. See also
CMS Res. 10.16, Priorities for CMS Agreements, Doc. UNEP/CMS/Res.
10.16, ¶ 6 (Nov. 20–25, 2011), https://perma.cc/5D4K-CCDX (recognizing
that the “development and servicing of agreements are subject to the availability of resources”). The Parties repealed these two resolutions in 2017 because the work outlined in them had been completed. See CMS, Review of
Decisions, Doc. UNEP/CMS/COP12/Doc.21/Rev.2, annex 2, at 22–24 (Aug.
10, 2017), https://perma.cc/7RRJ-R66K [hereinafter CMS Review of Decisions].
199. See generally CMS Res. 11.12, Criteria for Assessing Proposals for New
Agreements,
Doc.
UNEP/CMS/Res.
11.12
(Nov.
4–9,
2014),
https://perma.cc/8KUJ-L5JH. The criteria, originally adopted in Resolution
11.12, were incorporated into Resolution 12.8; Resolution 11.12 was then
repealed. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, ¶ 13(d). The original instruction
derives from Resolution 10.9, which called for the creation of “criteria
against which to assess proposed new potential agreements.” CMS Res. 10.9,
supra note 190, at annex 1, at Activity 12. See also UNEP Res. 10.16, supra
note 198, ¶ 6 (including eight considerations to be addressed when making
any new proposals for Agreements). The Parties repealed this resolution in
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Scientific Council are “instruct[ed]” and the CMS Parties are
“urg[ed]” to apply criteria such as identifying the relevant species’
conservation needs and the possibility for stable funding.200 These
criteria are designed to assess the “opportunities, risks, appropriateness and relative priority” of any new proposal for a new CMS
legal instrument.201
1. Conservation priority. The conservation priority criterion
requires an assessment of the severity of the conservation need “in
relation to the degree of species endangerment or unfavourable
conservation status as defined under the Convention.”202 As noted
above, the European eel is categorized as “Critically Endangered”
under the IUCN Red List, with glass eel recruitment reaching as
low as 1% of pre-1980 abundance in some localities.203 In addition,
the European eel’s status is clearly “unfavourable,” as defined by
CMS.204 With recruitment at a historic low, the species is unlikely

200.
201.

202.
203.
204.

2017 because it was superseded by subsequent resolutions. See CMS Review
of Decisions, supra note 198, at annex 2, at 23–24.
CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, ¶ 8.
Id. at annex, at 4. A paper prepared for the First Range States Workshop on
the European Eel and the Report of that workshop summarized those criteria and apply those criteria to the European eel. Otto Spijkers & Alex O.
Elferink, Potential for A New CMS Agreement on the European Eel, Doc.
UNEP/CMS/Eels WS1/Doc. 3, at 12-13 (Oct. 13–14, 2016),
https://perma.cc/P3N8-8NE9; Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on
the European Eel, supra note 24, ¶ 113 (This article looks at those criteria
in more detail in the context of a potential European Eel Agreement, while
acknowledging that some elements cannot be assessed until a proposal is
more fully developed.).
CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (i).
JACOBY & GOLLOCK , supra note 16, at 6.
Under CMS Article I, a species’ conservation status is considered “unfavourable” if any of the following criteria are not met:
(1) population dynamics data indicate that the migratory species is
maintaining itself on a long-term basis as a viable component of
its ecosystems;
(2) the range of the migratory species is neither currently being reduced, nor is likely to be reduced, on a long-term basis;
(3) there is, and will be in the foreseeable future sufficient habitat to
maintain the population of the migratory species on a long-term
basis; and
(4) the distribution and abundance of the migratory species approach
historic coverage and levels to the extent that potentially suitable
ecosystems exist and to the extent consistent with wise wildlife
management[.]
CMS, supra note 18, at art. I(1)(c)–(d).
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to maintain itself on a long-term basis without appropriate interventions. With large dams blocking migration and many more dams proposed in eel habitat,205 the eel’s range is currently being reduced and
likely will continue to be reduced on a long-term basis.
2. Serve a specific existing COP mandate. This criterion specifies that any new agreement respond to an expressed CMS strategy or other decision of the Parties.206 A new CMS legal instrument
to protect the European eel could help fulfill Goal 3 of the CMS
Strategic Plan, which calls for “improv[ing] the conservation status
of migratory species and the ecological connectivity and resilience
of their habitats.”207 Protecting near-shore and freshwater habitats across the species’ range would improve connectivity and resilience for the European eel because the European eel only occurs
in water bodies that are connected to the sea under natural conditions.208 Moreover, if Range States and territories can be brought
together to benefit the European eel, then Goal 5—to “[e]nhance
implementation through participatory planning, knowledge management and capacity building”209—would also be fulfilled.
Other CMS policies and strategies would also be addressed.
For example, Resolution 11.27 urges Parties to “undertake
measures to reduce or mitigate known serious impacts” on freshwater species from hydropower by, among other things, creating
fish ladders.210 Any strategy to protect eels would most probably
include provisions relating to restoring habitat above dams and removing obstacles to migration caused by hydroelectric and other
dams. Lastly, because Article IV of the CMS directs CMS Parties
to endeavor to conclude an agreement for Appendix II species,211

205. See supra Section II.C.2.
206. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (ii).
207. CMS Res. 11.2, Strategic Plan for Migratory Species 2015–2023,
UNEP/CMS/Res. 11.2, annex 1, Chapter 3, Goal 3 (Nov. 9, 2014),
https://perma.cc/Y7PJ-47XT.
208. CMS, Proposal for the Inclusion of the European Eel (Anguilla anguilla) on
CMS Appendix II, Doc. UNEP/CMS/COP11/Doc.24.1.18, at 8 (Sep. 12, 2014),
https://perma.cc/TJL2-QAZ3.
209. CMS Res. 11.2, supra note 207, at annex I, at Chapter 3, Goal 5.
210. CMS Res. 11.27, Renewable Energy and Migratory Species, Doc.
UNEP/CMS/Res. 11.27 (Rev. COP12), ¶ 3(d) (2017), https://perma.cc/ALN657EN.
211. Article IV(3) provides that “Parties that are Range States of migratory species
listed in Appendix II shall endeavour to conclude AGREEMENTS where these
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the preparation of a new legal instrument for the European eel,
already included in Appendix II, would fulfill an expressed CMS
strategy.
3. Clear and specific defined purpose. This criterion calls on
any proposal for a new CMS legal instrument to specify the intended conservation outcomes and ways that the target species
would benefit from international cooperation.212 As with other
CMS Agreements, the overall goal would be to restore the European eel to a favorable conservation status, consistent with CMS
Article V. More specifically, a so-called “European Eel Agreement”
could include, among other things, the following specific purposes
to improve the conservation status of the European eel:
• To coordinate conservation goals and strategies throughout the range of the European eel. Currently, EU Member
States have established a goal of 40% escapement of silver
eels,213 and Member States must develop EMPs for each
river basin inhabited by eels.214 Nineteen Member States
have developed EMPs to accomplish those goals.215 The
First Range States Workshop on the European Eel indicates that an escapement goal of 40% would be a key element of a future CMS Agreement.216 To ensure compatibility with EMPs developed by EU Range States, such a
goal would seem highly pragmatic—at least until a different range-wide goal could be agreed to within the context
of a European Eel Agreement, based on the available scientific information.

212.
213.

214.
215.
216.

should benefit the species and should give priority to those species in an unfavourable conservation status.” CMS, supra note 18, at art. IV(3).
CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (iii).
EU Eel Regulation, supra note 13, at art. 2(4). The provision provides in full:
The objective of each Eel Management Plan shall be to reduce anthropogenic mortalities so as to permit with high probability the escapement to the sea of at least 40% of the silver eel biomass relative to the
best estimate of escapement that would have existed if no anthropogenic influences had impacted the stock. The Eel Management Plan
shall be prepared with the purpose of achieving this objective in the
long term.
Id.
Id. at arts. 2(1), (3).
Eel Implementation Report, supra note 105, at 4.
Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, supra note
24, at 28.
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•

To develop and coordinate scientific research relating to
the European eel across its geographic range. As noted
above, scientists agree that much is unknown about the
European eel and the causes of its decline.217
• To ensure stakeholder participation in eel conservation.
The participation of stakeholders in the development of
eel conservation plans has been described as “marginal”
and “varied.”218 A CMS legal instrument could ensure
stakeholder participation.
Section VI of this Article describes a number of other provisions that could be included in a European Eel Agreement.
4. Absence of better remedies outside the CMS system.219 Alternatives to a CMS legal instrument all fall short of addressing
all threats to the European eel throughout the eel’s range. As noted
in Section III, RFMOs do not have the geographic or management
authority to manage eels. Other treaties focus on only one aspect
of eel conservation (for example, international trade under CITES).
In addition, other multilateral environmental agreements
(“MEAs”), such as the Convention on Biological Diversity
(“CBD”)220 or the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”),221 may provide general conservation duties but are
not designed to manage specific species.222 Only CMS has the authority to cover freshwater and marine habitat (including areas of
the high seas) and the full range of threats to the European eel.
5. Absence of better remedies inside the CMS system.223 CMS
offers alternatives to a new legal instrument, such as “concerted
actions” or “action plans,” but these are not likely to be better remedies. Concerted actions are “priority conservation measures, projects, or institutional arrangements undertaken to improve the
217.
218.
219.
220.

See supra Sections II.B and II.C.
Dekker, supra note 20, at 2445, 2447.
CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (iv).
Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S 79 (entered
into force Dec. 29, 1993), https://perma.cc/726C-CK3E [hereinafter CBD].
221. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S 3 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994), https://perma.cc/K4JD-2LTX
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
222. For more information on the inability of existing treaties to manage the full
range of threats to the European eel, see generally Spijkers & Elferink, supra note 201, at 5–11.
223. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (v).
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conservation status of selected Appendix I and Appendix II species
or selected groups of Appendix I and Appendix II species” that 1)
“involve measures that are the collective responsibility of Parties
acting in concert,” or 2) are “designed to support the conclusion of
an instrument under Article IV of the Convention and enable conservation measures to be progressed in the meantime or represent
an alternative to such an instrument.”224 In the past, the Parties
listed species for which concerted actions should be taken, but they
did not identify any specific conservation actions to take.225 Instead, each Party was free to determine what action it would take.
The concept of concerted actions has evolved; they now include
specific proposals that identify conservation actions to be undertaken by specified entities (e.g., Parties, Secretariat).226 Such concerted actions, as with action plans, apply only to CMS Parties that
are Range States. Thus, if either is adopted for the European eel,
it would not apply to non-Parties such as Iceland, Turkey, and the
Faroe Islands. While these non-Parties could participate informally in a concerted action, it is difficult to conceive, in most circumstances, how that would occur. For example, the Parties have
not called intersessional meetings to discuss implementation of the
concerted actions and, prior to COP12 in 2017, concerted actions
have not been publicized on the CMS website.227 Consequently, a
non-Party is unlikely to know that a concerted action has been
adopted. Intersessional meetings have occurred for some actions
plans, but they are rare and entirely dependent on voluntary contributions. With a CMS Agreement, the Agreement itself will specify the meeting schedule.228

224. CMS Res. 12.28, supra note 27, ¶ 1.
225. Prior to COP11, concerted actions applied to Appendix I species and cooperative actions applied to Appendix II species. While two different names applied, the process for identifying species and the outcome (a list) was the
same. CMS Res. 11.13, Concerted and Cooperative Actions, Doc.
UNEP/CMS/Resolution 11.13 (Nov. 4–9, 2014), https://perma.cc/VJN8KPJN. CMS Res. 11.13 was repealed by CMS Res. 12.28, supra note 24, ¶ 9.
226. See, e.g., CMS, Proposal for a Concerted Action for the Arabian Sea Humpback Whale (Megaptera novaeangliae), Doc. UNEP/CMS/COP12/Doc. 26.2.4,
at 4 (June 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/PH4H-672A.
227. Personal Communication with Melanie Virtue, Head, Aquatic Species Team,
CMS Secretariat (May 23, 2018).
228. Id.
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6. If a CMS instrument is best, extending an existing one is
not feasible.229 None of the existing CMS Agreements relates in
any way to the conservation of the European eel. Several existing
Agreements protect bird species (AEWA, ACAP, Memorandum of
Understanding on the Conservation of Migratory Birds of Prey in
Africa and Eurasia (“Raptors MOU”)), while others are terrestrialmammal focused (EUROBATS, West African Elephants MOU).
Those that involve marine species are focused on specific taxonomic groups (ACCOBAMS, ASCOBANS, IOSEA Turtle MOU,
Dugongs MOU, Sharks MOU). Aside from the Sharks MOU, no
other Agreement addresses fish species or fish conservation.
7. Prospects for funding. As noted above,230 adequate and
predictable financing is a key component driving the success of a
CMS Agreement. Although beyond the scope of this Article, identifying prospects for funding is also a criterion for evaluating proposals for new CMS Agreements.231 However, given the value of
the European eel as food and bait and the dire conservation status
of the species, the prospects for funding would seem promising.
That said, conservation need and funding do not always align.
CMS itself provides good examples. Despite the continuing decline
of the African elephant in West Africa, the Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for the West African Populations of the African Elephant (Loxodonta africana) remains mostly unfunded.232 With respect to funding a European Eel
Agreement, the EU—with 27 of 28 Member States (all but Hungary) included as Range States of the European eel233—might be a
place to start.234
8. Synergies and cost-effectiveness.235 A CMS Agreement for
European eels that includes actions to protect the Sargasso Sea
will have significant synergistic effects with other CMS initiatives.
As described in the designation of the Sargasso Sea as an Ecologically or Biologically Significant Marine Area (“EBSA”) under the

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (vi).
See supra Section IV.C.
CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (vii).
CMS Assessment of MOUs, supra note 180, at 37.
JACOBY & GOLLOCK , supra note 16, at 4.
See Spijkers & Elferink, supra note 201, at 15 (identifying the EU as a potential funder).
235. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (viii).
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CBD,236 the Sargasso Sea is home to several species of shark and
cetaceans that are the subject of other CMS legal instruments and
resolutions, including the Sharks MOU237 and the Global Programme of Work for Cetaceans.238 Other species included in the
CMS Appendices, including the green turtle (Chelonia mydas),
hawksbill turtle (Eretmochelys imbricate), loggerhead turtle
(Caretta caretta), and Kemp’s ridley turtle (Lepidochelys kempii),
all of which are included in both Appendix I and II, use Sargassum
as a nursery habitat.239 Adult leatherback sea turtles (Dermochelys coriacea) also use the Sargasso Sea.240
Moreover, any measure to protect the European eel in its
freshwater habitat will also benefit the freshwater fish species included in the Appendices and, thus, help implement Resolution
10.12 on migratory freshwater fish. That resolution specifically
calls on Parties “to strengthen measures to protect migratory
freshwater fish species against threats, including habitat destruction, habitat fragmentation, overfishing, bycatch, invasive species,
pollution and barriers to migration.”241
Because the European eel is adversely affected by habitat loss
and degradation, barriers to migration, and overexploitation, a
CMS Agreement for the species would also help the Parties implement paragraph 6 of Resolution 10.12, which calls on Parties to:
[E]ngage in international cooperation on migratory freshwater
fish, which would focus on CMS-listed fish species, at sub-regional
or regional levels, noting that this cooperation should, inter
alia[,] . . . . b) identify and implement effective measures, as appropriate, to mitigate threats such as habitat degradation, barriers to
migration, bycatch and overexploitation[.]242

236. Ecologically or Biologically Significant Areas (EBSAs): The Sargasso Sea,
CBD (June 15, 2015), https://perma.cc/BK2A-K63M.
237. See generally Sharks MOU, supra note 164.
238. See generally CMS Res. 10.15, Global Programme of Work for Cetaceans,
Doc. UNEP/CMS/Resolution 10.15 (Oct. 2017), https://perma.cc/Y3BV-68SZ.
239. Ecologically or Biologically Significant Areas (EBSAs): The Sargasso Sea,
supra note 236.
240. Id.
241. CMS Res. 10.12, Freshwater Migratory Species, Doc. UNEP/CMS/Resolution 10.12, ¶ 2 (Nov. 20–25, 2011), https://perma.cc/5HHJ-LS3R.
242. Id. ¶ 6(b).
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Any measures to reduce habitat loss and degradation, barriers
to migration, and overexploitation are likely to benefit not only the
many freshwater migratory species included in the CMS Appendices but other species as well. Because reports indicate that 38%
of European freshwater fish are threatened,243 measures to protect
the European eel could have significant conservation benefits for
many of these species as well.
With respect to cost-effectiveness, proposals should identify
the resources needed to implement the new CMS Agreement. The
exact scale of the resources needed to administer a European Eel
Agreement is difficult to predict because no current CMS Agreement has the same combination of number of species (1), number
of Range States and territories (57), range of threats, and geographic scope covering freshwater and marine habitats, as well as
jurisdictional waters and areas beyond national jurisdiction. The
potential costs of a European Eel Agreement are discussed in more
detail in Section VI.H. Whether such an Agreement would be costeffective will be a subjective inquiry in light of the time lag for any
conservation benefits to be achieved.
9. Prospects for leadership in developing an Agreement.244 A
highly committed leader, whether a government or nongovernmental organization, can help ensure the successful development and
implementation of a CMS Agreement. In a report concerning the
viability of CMS MOUs, the CMS Secretariat noted the following:
For some avian and marine mammal MOUs, having one highly
committed partner, which feels a genuine sense of partnership
may be sufficient to ensure a good degree of implementation; BirdLife International and Whale and Dolphin Conservation (WDC)
are examples of this. Similarly with the Bukhara Deer MOU, there
has been little engagement from the Secretariat over the years,
but one committed NGO (WWF Russia) uses the MOU and its Action Plan to engage with the relevant governments in existing fora,
and ensures conservation actions are being implemented.
Conversely, the lack of any suitable stakeholders to assist with
implementation can cause significant problems. This is particularly the case on the west coast of Africa, where the Secretariat

243. CMS, Executive Summary: Review of Freshwater Fish, Doc.
UNEP/CMS/Conf.10.32, ¶ 1 (Sept. 28 2011), https://perma.cc/RSA6-CQQQ.
244. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (ix).
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has been unable to identify a suitable NGO or other partner to assist with the implementation of the three MOUs there.245

The prospects for leadership in developing and implementing
a CMS Agreement for European eels appear to be very strong. The
Sargasso Sea Commission246 has taken an active role in protecting
not only the Sargasso Sea but also species that depend on it. This
independent Commission is appointed by the Government of Bermuda, pursuant to the provisions of the 2014 Hamilton Declaration
on Collaboration for the Conservation of the Sargasso Sea,247 a political declaration now signed by nine governments.248 The Commission’s mission, supported by the government Signatories and a
number of collaborating partners from the science and conservation world,249 is to “[e]xercise a stewardship role for the Sargasso
Sea and keep its health, productivity and resilience under continual review.”250 The Sargasso Sea Commission helped organize the
First Range States Workshop on the European Eel,251 is organizing
the second Range States workshop,252 and appears fully committed
to ensuring the implementation of any CMS European Eel Agreement. It also developed the proposal that led to the establishment
of the Sargasso Sea as an EBSA, helped motivate the proposal to

245. CMS Assessment of MOUs, supra note 180, at 36.
246. About the Commission, SARGASSO SEA COMM’N, https://perma.cc/QL966BFH. More details about the history of the Sargasso Sea Commission can
be found at David Freestone & Kate Killerlain Morrison, Current Legal Developments: The Sargasso Sea, 27 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 345 (2012),
https://perma.cc/8CYB-VJYX, and David Freestone & Faith Bulger, The
Sargasso Sea Commission: An Innovative Approach to the Conservation of
Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, 30 OCEAN Y.B. 80 (2016),
https://perma.cc/38M2-NHP3.
247. Hamilton Declaration on Collaboration for the Conservation of the Sargasso
Sea, Mar. 11, 2014, https://perma.cc/48MG-VUAL [hereinafter Hamilton
Declaration].
248. These nine governments are the Azores, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin
Islands, Canada, Cayman Islands, Monaco, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Id.
249. See Collaborating Partners, SARGASSO SEA COMM’N, https://perma.cc/C7LLA3CQ.
250. Hamilton Declaration, supra note 247, at annex II, ¶ (a).
251. Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, supra note
24, ¶ 171.
252. Personal Communication with David Freestone (Sept. 1, 2017).
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include the European eel in CMS Appendix II, and spurred the concerted action on the European eel adopted by the CMS Parties in
2017.253
10. Prospects for coordination of the Agreement’s implementation. This criterion asks proposals to demonstrate meaningful prospects for coordinating implementation of the Agreement, such as
through hosting of a Secretariat and organizing meetings.254 It is
beyond the scope of this Article to inquire among governments and
institutions as to whether they are willing to host a Secretariat.
Nonetheless, the active engagement of the Sargasso Sea Commission discussed above indicates that such prospects may be
“good.”255
11. Feasibility in other respects. This criterion asks proposals
for new Agreements to address the practical feasibility of launching and operating the Agreement by considering, for example, “political stability or diplomatic barriers.”256 The close regional proximity of many of the Range States and territories, their tight
political ties through the EU, the European Economic Area, and
the Joint Africa-EU Strategy,257 as well as the close environmental
working relationships among European and North African Range
States through AEWA, the Raptors MOU, and other conservation
agreements such as OSPAR, indicate that there are no diplomatic
or political barriers to a European Eel Agreement. In addition,
some of the non-EU Range States share similar concerns. Some of
the North African Range States, for example, have banned eel fishing.258 Thus, there do not appear to be any political or diplomatic
barriers to a European Eel Agreement.
Even without political and diplomatic barriers, it may take
time to convince Range States that a European Eel Agreement is
253. See Concerted Action on European Eel, supra note 28, at 1 (acknowledging
that the Sargasso Sea Commission commissioned the basic science that led
to the proposal for including the European eel in CMS Appendix II submitted by Monaco).
254. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (x).
255. See infra Section VI.G (which explores four options for hosting a secretariat).
256. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (xi).
257. In 2014 at the Fourth EU-Africa Summit, European and African governments agreed to the Roadmap 2014–17. See Fourth EU–Africa Summit
Roadmap
2014–2017,
EU–Africa
Summit
(Apr.
3,
2014),
https://perma.cc/PD3W-JJBE.
258. 2016 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 103, at 49–50.
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necessary. EU Member States, for example, may believe that
EMPs they are developing under the EU Eel Regulation are sufficient. Other Range States may have other concerns and may not
prioritize engagement in the negotiation and implementation of an
Eel Agreement. These challenges are difficult to assess in the abstract, and it may be necessary engage in some shuttle diplomacy
to determine whether there is real political commitment to a European Eel Agreement.
12. Likelihood of success. This criterion asks the Parties to
evaluate certain risks, such as the uncertainty about the ecological
effects, the lack of a “legacy mechanism” to sustain the agreement’s
success, and activities that may undermine the Agreement’s success.259 Unlike the previous criterion, which focuses on implementation, this criterion focuses on whether the Agreement will
achieve its intended outcome.260 Thus, the question appears to ask
whether an Agreement will result in the conservation of the European eel.
Given the substantial lack of knowledge with respect to the
European eel’s life history and the contribution of each threatening
factor to the eel’s decline, it is nearly impossible to determine the
likelihood of success that any CMS Agreement might have. However, in the absence of some mechanism to coordinate the 57 Range
States and territories of the European eel, it seems highly unlikely
that the eel’s conservation status will improve.
In addition, it is not clear what is meant by the phrase “legacy
mechanism”; Resolution 12.8 and its supporting documents do not
provide concrete examples. To the extent that it refers to conservation strategies that will endure over time, it is simply too early to
make that assessment. To the extent that it asks whether institutions will sustain their engagement in eel conservation over the
long-term, perhaps a more positive response is possible due to longterm interest in eel conservation expressed by the Sargasso Sea
Commission. Also, the European Commission, with its mandate to
coordinate EU Member States, may qualify as a “legacy mechanism,” provided that the Commission and the EU Member States
can be convinced to participate in an Eel Agreement.
259. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (xii).
260. CMS, Developing, Resourcing and Servicing CMS Agreements: A Policy Approach, Doc. UNEP/CMS/COP11/Doc.22.2, annex 1, ¶ 6 (Aug. 5, 2014),
https://perma.cc/Z3KZ-4CSL.
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13. Magnitude of likely impact. This criterion asks about the
number of species and countries that will benefit from a proposed
CMS Agreement, as well as the catalytic and “multiplier” effects it
might have.261 As indicated by the response to criterion 8 above,
the catalytic and multiplier impacts of a European Eel Agreement
could be substantial because of the number of CMS species that
use the Sargasso Sea and freshwater habitats also occupied by the
eel. In addition, while 19 EU Member States are implementing the
EU’s Eel Regulation to varying degrees, a European Eel Agreement could extend coordinated eel conservation efforts to the remaining Range States and territories.
14. Provision for monitoring and evaluation. The criterion for
monitoring and evaluation includes a long list of subcriteria that
focus on defining a specific mechanism for monitoring and evaluating relevant scientific and technical information and progress towards implementation by the Parties/Signatories, among other related activities.262 Any European Eel Agreement would need a
Secretariat and a meeting of the Parties/Signatories to review relevant scientific and technical information and to coordinate conservation strategies across the 57 Range States and territories.
Given the lack of scientific information about the eel’s life history
and impacts to the eel, a scientific or advisory committee would
need to be a key element of any European Eel Agreement. The possibilities for such a committee, including representation of the
Working Group on Eels (“WGEEL”),263 are described more fully in
the next section.
VI. OPTIONS FOR A CMS LEGAL INSTRUMENT FOR
THE EUROPEAN EEL
A CMS legal instrument for the European eel does not fit
neatly into any existing CMS Agreement for purposes of drawing
comparisons. While several CMS Agreements have a broad geographic scope, they also cover multiple species (e.g., Sharks MOU,
Raptors MOU, IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, ACAP, and AEWA).

261. CMS Res. 12.8, supra note 140, at annex, ¶ (xiii).
262. Id. at annex, ¶ (xiv).
263. For more about the WGEEL, see WGEEL: Joint EIFAAC/ICES/GFCM
Working Group on Eels, ICIEM/CIEM, https://perma.cc/S63A-FF98.
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A European Eel Agreement would have a broad, regional geographic scope but cover only one species. In addition, unlike some
CMS Agreements that include a range of developed and developing
Range States and territories, a European Eel Agreement would include primarily developed-country Range States. Among CMS instruments, perhaps only the Dugong MOU, with its single-species
focus on the dugong (Dugong dugon) and 46 Range States, is similar in geographic and species scope, but those Range States are
primarily least-developed and developing countries.264 Because the
eel’s range encompasses a large number of Range States and territories—including developed European countries, developing North
African countries, and only one least-developed country265—a European Eel Agreement might be more similar to the Sharks MOU
or the IOSEA Marine Turtle MOU, with their regional focus and
more balanced mix of developed and developing Range States.
Given the broad geographic region, the potential need to include
more than one language, and the array of conservation measures
that are needed to address eel conservation, a European Eel Agreement would likely require “a central Secretariat . . . with significant funding to maintain a level of core activity.”266
In addition to Secretariat costs, the large number of Range
States and territories will likely increase costs because it is assumed that any European Eel Agreement will have more than one
working language. Consequently, the Agreement will require additional resources for coordination, translation, interpretation, and
meetings.267 The relatively small number of developing country
Range States, however, may benefit any such Agreement because
few developing countries will require financial assistance to participate in meetings. These and other issues are discussed below.

264. See Dugong MOU, Dugong Summary Sheet, https://perma.cc/5ECC-UGXU.
Fifteen of the 46 Range States are least-developed countries. List of Least
Developed Countries, U.N. COMM. FOR DEV. POLICY (June 2017),
https://perma.cc/4AK7-CJJY.
265. Mauritania is the only European eel Range State listed as a least-developed
country. List of Least Developed Countries, supra note 264.
266. CMS Assessment of MOUs, supra note 180, at 35.
267. Id. at 17–19.
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Binding Versus Nonbinding

As noted in the preceding section, the conservation outcomes
of a CMS Agreement do not appear dependent on whether the
Agreement is legally binding or not. However, the legally binding
character of an agreement has two principal impacts in the context
of a CMS Agreement for European eels.
First, and as noted earlier,268 a legally binding Agreement
takes longer to bring into force than a non-legally binding MOU.
Given the dire conservation status of the European eel, a lengthy
period prior to entry into force may be undesirable.
Second, a legally binding Agreement requires financial contributions from the Parties, likely based on the UN scale of assessments. The Agreement’s costs, including secretariat support and
any programmatic work, would be paid from mandatory contributions, which have led to more stable funding than MOUs (excluding
the Gorilla Agreement).269 In addition to helping ensure the success of the Agreement,270 such a contribution scheme would likely
be considered fair because it is consistent with UN practice.
A non-legally binding MOU, in contrast, would be paid from
voluntary contributions and, given the current administration of
MOUs, would require extensive in-kind contributions from the
CMS Secretariat—costs that would be paid by CMS Parties only
and not by non-Party Range States or territories. The CMS Parties
that are also Eel MOU Signatories may perceive the non-CMS
Party Signatories to an Eel MOU as “free riders” that are taking
advantage of the contributions made by Parties to the CMS
budget.271 Thirteen of the 57 Range States and territories (22.8%)
are CMS non-Parties.272 With a relatively large number of free riders, Range States and territories may prefer a legally binding
Agreement. Similarly, CMS Parties that are not eel Range States
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See supra Section IV.B.
Lee et al., supra note 176, ¶¶ 45–58.
See supra Section IV.C.
Lee et al., supra note 176, ¶ 96.
The thirteen are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Faroe Islands, Iceland, Lebanon,
Macedonia, the former Yugoslav Republic, Moldova, Russia, and Turkey, in
addition to four territories (Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, and Jersey).
However, these four UK territories would be covered by the UK’s participation if the UK expressly includes them on signing or ratification. Memorandum on Application, U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
https://perma.cc/DHX4-CSWQ (last updated Nov. 3, 2009).
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may feel that all Eel MOU Signatories are consuming a disproportionate amount of the CMS budget, particularly from the CMS Administration and Finance team which would be asked to help administer an Eel MOU, but which may not receive financial
contributions as part of an Eel MOU.
A strategy to avoid this conundrum might be to negotiate an
MOU and binding Agreement simultaneously. The MOU could be
relatively simple. It could set up an interim Secretariat and include
an Action Plan. The MOU and its Action Plan would commence on
signing. Meanwhile, a more developed Article IV(3) AGREEMENT
could establish more detailed provisions, including reporting and
monitoring obligations and a permanent Secretariat; the MOU’s
Action Plan would carry over to the legally binding Agreement.
This strategy is not without risk, however. The legally binding
Agreement might never enter into force, which could result in an
MOU that is not fully developed. If the Eel MOU is modeled on
existing MOUs, however, then it may be possible to avoid an underdeveloped Eel MOU.
B. Scope
To ensure that a European Eel Agreement covers the broad
range of habitats and geographical distribution of the European
eel, the Agreement should not attempt to define an “Agreement
Area.” Instead, as with ACAP for albatrosses and petrels,273 a European Eel Agreement should be based on the conservation of eels
and their habitats. “Habitat” should then be defined to mean “any
area that contains suitable living conditions, during any part of
their life history, for eels.”
In addition, while the First Workshop of Range States of the
European Eel suggested that a new CMS Agreement should focus
on the European eel, it also indicated that it could be expanded to
include the American eel at a later date.274 To ensure that the
Agreement can be expanded to include the American eel (see Section VII below), the Agreement should include the species covered
in an Appendix as CMS and many other CMS Agreements do. For
example, the Raptors MOU applies to “Birds of Prey,” defined as
273. See supra Section IV.B.
274. Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on European Eels, supra note 24,
¶ 145.
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“migratory populations of Falconiformes and Strigiformes species
occurring in Africa and Eurasia, listed in Annex 1 of this
[MOU].”275 Likewise, the Sharks MOU applies to any migratory
species, subspecies, or population in the Class Chondrichthyes included in Annex 1 of the MOU.276 In a similar fashion, an Eel
Agreement could apply to “eels” or “anguillid species” included in
an Annex.
C. Objective
Ideally, a European Eel Agreement would establish a measurable conservation target to be achieved within a specified
timeframe.277 ICES has recommended an escapement goal for silver eels of 50%,278 but the EU has adopted a goal of 40%.279 However, the EU Eel Regulation does not specify a timeframe for meeting that goal. Instead, it calls for achieving that goal “in the long
term.”280 Given the life history of the European eel, with individuals reaching sexual maturity in variable time periods, the failure
to designate a specific timeframe for achieving the 40% escapement
goal is understandable. Nonetheless, without a more specific
timeframe for achieving a goal, it is difficult to determine progress
towards the escapement target. Thus, a European Eel Agreement
would benefit from adopting the EU’s escapement goal to ensure
complementarity between the two regimes, but it should adopt specific timeframes for achieving the goal.

275. Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Migratory Birds of
Prey in Africa and Eurasia, ¶ 1(a) (opened for signature Nov. 1, 2008) (entered into force Nov. 1, 2008), https://perma.cc/W7VK-ATY5 at ¶ 1(a) [hereinafter Raptors MOU].
276. Sharks MOU, supra note 164, § 3(p).
277. See Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, supra
note 24, at Summary of Outcomes, § 1.
278. 2015 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 28.
279. EU Eel Regulation, supra note 13, at art. 2(4).
280. Id. (“The Eel Management Plan shall be prepared with the purpose of
achieving this objective in the long term.”)
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D. Conservation Obligations
1.

Provisions Regarding Take and Trade

Although the EU bans the import and export of European eels,
the fishery still remains a significant economic activity, employing
about 25,000 people throughout Europe to support the EU market
for eels.281 Presumably, eel fisheries also generate significant numbers of jobs in non-EU States. Consequently, a European Eel
Agreement would need to adopt harvesting rules consistent with
the eel’s role as a source of food, bait, and jobs or, if a harvest prohibition is desired, recognize the economic implications of that
choice.
Currently, because the European eel is included in CMS Appendix II, international law does not prohibit the taking of European eels.282 In addition, because the European eel is included in
CITES Appendix II, States may allow its trade,283 provided that
relevant CITES export permits are issued, including a finding that
the trade will not be detrimental to the survival of the species (a
finding known as the “non-detriment” finding).284 As noted earlier,
exports have increased sharply in recent years.285 With a dearth of
scientific information concerning European eels, it seems unlikely
that an adequate non-detriment finding can be made; indeed, that

281. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON EELS AND CITES, supra note 36, at 6.
282. See CMS, supra note 18, at arts. IV–V (not imposing any specific prohibitions against take or trade).
283. CITES, supra note 14, at art. IV (not prohibiting trade for primarily commercial purposes).
284. CITES requires exporting countries to determine that exports of Appendix
II specimens will not be detrimental to the survival of the species, the specimens were legally acquired, and for living specimens that the specimens
will be prepared and shipped so as to avoid injury and cruel treatment. Id.
at art. IV(2).
285. See supra Section II.C.1.
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was the opinion of EU scientists leading up to the EU’s ban on imports and exports of European eel.286 Because CITES clearly provides that an affirmative finding of no detriment is required,287 a
lack of scientific information should preclude issuance of an export
permit. In addition, as the European Commission has reported,
“[s]cientists constantly advise that all humanly induced mortality
(fisheries and non-fishing anthropogenic mortality) should be reduced to as close to zero as possible and that urgent action is
needed.”288 Thus, a European Eel Agreement may wish to adopt
measures stronger than those provided in CITES and CMS and
strictly regulate national and international trade.289
If an Eel Agreement allows trade, then negotiators may want
to consider provisions requiring the issuance of catch documents,
as many RFMOs require for harvest of tuna290 and toothfish.291
RFMOs have adopted catch documentation schemes (“CDS”) to
prevent illegal, unreported, and unregulated (“IUU”) fishing.292
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(“FAO”) has defined CDS as

286. In December 2010, the Scientific Review Group (“SRG”), established under
the EU Eel Regulation, concluded that “it was not possible for the SRG to
consider that the capture or collection of European eel specimens in the wild
or their export will not have a harmful effect on the conservation status of
the species.” SCI. REVIEW GRP., SHORT SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF THE
54TH MEETING OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVIEW GROUP ON TRADE IN WILD FAUNA
AND FLORA ¶ 8 (2010), https://perma.cc/THU3-XAFG.
287. CITES provides that “[a]n export permit shall only be granted when . . . a
Scientific Authority of the State of export has advised that such export will
not be detrimental to the survival of that species.” CITES, supra note 14, at
art. IV(2)(a).
288. Eel Implementation Report, supra note 105, at 7.
289. International agreements set minimum standards unless expressly stated
otherwise. CITES, for example, specifically recognizes the right of Parties to
adopt measures stricter that those found in CITES. CITES, supra note 14,
at art. XIV(1).
290. See, e.g., International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas,
Recommendation by ICCAT Amending Recommendation 09-11 on an
ICCAT Bluefin Tuna Catch Documentation Program, Recommendation 1120, at 1 (2011).
291. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,
Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp., Conservation Measure
10-05, at 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/LY2F-NLEK.
292. See Gilles Hosch, Catch Documentation Schemes: Practices and Applicability in Combating IUU Fishing, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N.,
https://perma.cc/K864-DMC3.
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[a] system that tracks and traces fish from the point of capture
through unloading and throughout the supply chain. A CDS records and certifies information that identifies the origin of fish
caught and ensures they were harvested in a manner consistent
with relevant national, regional and international conservation
and management measures. The objective of the CDS is to combat
IUU fishing by limiting access of IUU fish and fishery products to
markets.293

Given reports of high levels of illegal trade of European eel and
other eel species,294 a CDS may be one possible strategy for allowing harvest and trade but also ensuring that the harvest and trade
are legal. It would allow Parties or Signatories to an Eel Agreement to regulate harvest and trade more strictly than CMS and
CITES without actually prohibiting those activities. With the European eel critically endangered, the species might qualify for an
Appendix I listing under CMS, which would prohibit the take of
listed species, and an Appendix I listing under CITES, which
would prohibit international trade for primarily commercial purposes. A CDS for eels may, thus, represent a viable “middle
ground.”
Importantly, implementation of measures stricter than CMS
or CITES for take and trade might require new implementing legislation if States do not currently have legislation that allows for
such measures. Similarly, implementation of a CDS for eels is not
contemplated by CMS and would likely require new domestic implementing legislation. A legally binding Eel Agreement might be
necessary in order to ensure that States are compelled to adopt
such legislation295 or have the authority to do so.296
293. FAO Expert Consultation on Catch Documentation Schemes, FAO Fisheries
and Aquaculture Rep., Doc. FIPM/R1120, app. D, § 4.1 (July 21–24, 2015),
https://perma.cc/8YAA-2FTP.
294. See supra Section II.C.1.
295. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (“Every treaty
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith.”).
296. In some States, treaties are considered superior to domestic legal obligations. Article 55 of the French Constitution, for example, provides, in English translation, “Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall,
upon publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament, subject, in regard to each
agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party.” 1958 CONST. art.
55 (Fr.).
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Eel Management Plans

An important question that negotiators of an Eel Agreement
must answer is whether to adopt a top-down or bottom-up approach to eel conservation. The top-down approach would consist
of eel conservation measures that must be adopted by all Parties/Signatories. For example, each Party/Signatory would be required to prohibit the take of eels or construct fish ladders around
migration obstacles such as dams. The bottom-up approach would
allow local and national officials to undertake nation- or basinwide measures to address the specific conservation challenges in
that area.
The Critically Endangered status of the European eel suggests
that the top-down approach would be more effective. To ensure
that the species recovers as quickly as possible, each Party/Signatory would undertake the full range of measures identified in the
Agreement.
However, the top-down approach may discourage some States
or territories from participating in the Agreement. In addition, the
European eel may be relatively more abundant in some places;
dams too short to pose a barrier to migration may be more prevalent in some Range States. Under these circumstances, a bottomup approach might be more effective. To quickly launch an Eel
Agreement, the bottom-up approach, focused on basin-wide EMPs,
may offer the most viable option, largely because the EU Member
States, which constitute a large proportion of European eel Range
States, have already adopted this approach through the EU Eel
Regulation.297 Attracting EU participation may be very difficult
under a different approach.
Under the EU’s approach, Member States are required to prepare EMPs for each river basin, which may include maritime waters, that constitutes natural habitat for the European eel.298 The
overall goal of an EMP must be to reduce mortality “so as to permit
with high probability the escapement to the sea of at least 40% of
the silver eel biomass relative to the best estimate of escapement
that would have existed if no anthropogenic influences had impacted the stock.”299 The EU Eel Regulation does not specify the
297. EU Eel Regulation, supra note 13, at art. 2(4).
298. Id. at art. 2(1)–(4).
299. Id. at art. 2(4).
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types of measures that must be adopted in an EMP. Instead, Member States may adopt measures based on local and regional conditions,300 so long as those measures are designed to meet the 40%
escapement goal “in the long term.”301 An EMP may contain a variety of measures, including measures to reduce commercial fishing activity, restrict recreational fishing, restock eels, make rivers
passable, improve river habitats, transport silver eels from inland
waters, combat predators, and reduce mortality from hydroelectric
power turbines.302
As of 2013, 19 Member States had adopted EMPs for 81 basins.303 According to ICES, most management actions relate to
commercial and recreational fisheries, while other measures relate
to hydropower-pumping station obstacles, habitat, restocking, and
predator control.304 The EMPs have also resulted in the establishment of implementation and monitoring programs and new scientific studies. Of the specified management actions, 756 have been
fully implemented, 259 partially implemented, and 107 not implemented.305
Despite these management actions, it is too early to determine
whether the EU’s bottom-up approach is effective in achieving the
40% escapement goal or a contribution to recovery of the stock as
a whole.306 As the European Commission reports:
[s]cientific advice underlines that the effectiveness of individual
management measures cannot always be demonstrated: necessary
data are missing or the measures concerned are not expected to
produce their effects immediately or in the short term. For instance, there is high probability that restrictions on fisheries for
silver eel have contributed to increases in silver eel escapement.
However, management measures targeting eels prior to the silver
eel stage (for instance restocking) are not expected to have yet contributed to increased silver eel escapement for biological reasons
(generational lag time, ranging from approximately 5 years in
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at art. 2(7).
Id. at art. 2(4).
Id. at art. 2(8).
Eel Implementation Report, supra note 105, at 4.
INT’L COUNCIL FOR THE EXPL. OF THE SEA, REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON
EVALUATION PROGRESS EEL MANAGEMENT PLANS (WKEPEMP) 6 (2013),
https://perma.cc/24KG-B879 [hereinafter 2013 WKEPEMP REPORT].
305. Id.
306. Eel Implementation Report, supra note 105, at 5.
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Mediterranean lagoons to 25–30 years in northern Europe). Nonfisheries measures related to hydropower, pumping stations and
migration obstacles are also difficult to evaluate at this point in
time, mainly due to the site-specific nature of potential impacts
and lack of post-evaluation data. The advice does not conclude that
these management measures are ineffective or that will not be effective in the longer term.307

Nonetheless, the EMPs are not without utility. The European
Commission also reported that, of the 81 Eel Management Units
(“EMUs”), 17 EMUs were achieving their biomass targets, and 24
EMUs were achieving their anthropogenic mortality targets.308
Not all the information was positive, however: 42 EMUs reported
not achieving their biomass targets, and19 reported not achieving
their mortality targets.309 Reporting was insufficient to evaluate
the achievement of biomass targets for 22 EMUs and mortality targets for 38 EMUs.310
3.

Restocking

Restocking basins with eels seems like a commonsense measure to improve abundance and increase eel recruitment. In fact,
virtually all EU EMPs include restocking as a conservation measure.311 The EU Eel Regulation also requires a Member State that
allows fishing for eels under 12 centimeters in total length to reserve a minimum of 60% of their catch for restocking purposes.312
Scientists, however, are not convinced that restocking is a viable tool for eel recovery. Some studies “unambiguously state” that
major knowledge gaps prevent firm conclusions about the utility of
restocking, while others suggest that eels from a stocked watershed migrate similarly to wild populations,313 indicating that restocking could contribute to eel recovery. Others question restocking’s effectiveness in increasing spawning stock.314

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
EU Eel Regulation, supra note 13, at art. 7(1).
See JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 14 (citations omitted).
See Eel Implementation Report, supra note 105, at 6.
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If negotiators of a European Eel Agreement include restocking
as a tool for eel recovery, then the Agreement must ensure that
provisions are adopted to evaluate the efficacy and effects of restocking.315 One such provision could require marking of all
stocked eels to distinguish wild from restocked eels for sampling
and monitoring purposes.316
4.

Provisions Relating to the Sargasso Sea

Because European eels spawn in the Sargasso Sea,317 negotiators of an Eel Agreement may wish to include provisions to protect this habitat. Parts of the Sargasso Sea lie within Bermuda’s
exclusive economic zone, while other parts lie on the high seas (areas beyond national jurisdiction).318 Further, scientists are unclear
exactly where spawning takes place.319 Consequently, protection
of spawning habitat may require protection of the Sargasso Sea
both within Bermuda’s exclusive economic zone and on the high
seas.
UNCLOS already prohibits the harvesting of catadromous
species, such as the European eel, on the high seas.320 Most but not
all European eel Range States are party to UNCLOS; Israel, Libya,
Syria, and Turkey are the eel Range States that are not.321 To ensure complete coverage, an Eel Agreement would want to include
provisions to protect eels in the high seas portions of the Sargasso
Sea.

315. Id. at 8.
316. Håkan Wickström & Niklas B. Sjöberg, Traceability of Stocked Eels – The
Swedish Approach, 23 ECOLOGY OF FRESHWATER FISH 33 (2014).
317. See 2014 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 41, at 9.
318. Dan Laffoley et al., Submission of Scientific Information to Describe Ecologically or Biologically Significant Marine Areas 5 (unpublished report presented to the Sargasso Sea Alliance), https://perma.cc/K5ZF-BXGW.
319. Id. at 11.
320. UNCLOS, supra note 221, at art. 67(2) (“Harvesting of catadromous species
shall be conducted only in waters landward of the outer limits of exclusive
economic zones. When conducted in exclusive economic zones, harvesting
shall be subject to this article and the other provisions of this Convention
concerning fishing in these zones.”).
321. Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the
Convention and the Related Agreements, U.N. OCEANS & LAW OF THE SEA,
https://perma.cc/7VBF-4KPM (last updated Apr. 3, 2018).
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A variety of CMS Agreements apply to the high seas and impose obligations on Parties/Signatories in those areas. For example, they apply the Agreement to the “nationals and vessels” of Parties/Signatories without limiting the geographic scope to a State or
territory’s jurisdiction. This is the approach taken by the Pacific
Cetaceans MOU and the IOSEA Turtle MOU.322
ACAP takes a different approach by implicitly imposing obligations on Parties in high seas areas. Albatrosses and petrels are
caught as bycatch in longline and other commercial fisheries.323
Rather than designate areas off limits to fishing, ACAP provides
that the Parties “shall endeavour individually and collectively to
manage marine habitats” so as to avoid pollution that may harm
these birds and ensure the sustainability of resources that provide
food for them.324 Parties must also “individually or collectively seek
to develop management plans for the most important foraging and
migratory habitats of albatrosses and petrels”325 and “take special
measures individually and collectively to conserve marine areas
which they consider critical to the survival and/or restoration of
species of albatrosses and petrels which have unfavourable conservation status.”326 Because ACAP defines “habitat” as “any area
which contains suitable living conditions for albatrosses and/or
petrels,”327 it is clear that ACAP requires Parties to take action to
protect high seas habitats.
Although no oceanic eel fisheries appear to currently exist,328
the negotiators of a European Eel Agreement could use either of
these approaches to adopt a prohibition against eel fishing in the
322. See, e.g., Pacific Islands Cetaceans MOU, supra note 152, ¶ 11; IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, supra note 154, at “Basic Principles,” ¶ 2.
323. About ACAP, ACAP, https://perma.cc/E3GQ-U9M6 (last updated Dec. 27,
2017) (stating that “[o]ne of the most significant threats facing albatrosses
and petrels is mortality resulting from interactions with fishing gear, especially longline- and trawl-fishing operations”).
324. ACAP, supra note 147, at annex 2, ¶ 2.3.1.
325. Id. at annex 2, ¶ 2.3.2.
326. Id. at annex 2, ¶ 2.3.3.
327. Id. at art. I(2)(j).
328. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament: Development of a Community Action Plan for the Management
of European Eel, at 4, COM (2003) 573 final (Oct. 1, 2003) (“No targeted
fisheries take place in oceanic waters but river mouths, coastal areas with
brackish waters and continental fresh water bodies are all subject to different types of fisheries.”), https://perma.cc/WY6P-EV72.
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Sargasso Sea, anywhere on the high seas, or beyond some distance
from the coast. Such a provision would help ensure that such fisheries are not developed and protect the eel’s migration. In addition,
such a prohibition would not be unusual. A variety of RFMOs have
adopted fishing bans to protect certain habitats or species. For example, NAFO prohibits bottom trawling on specified seamounts,
corals, and areas with high densities of sponges.329 The South East
Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (“SEAFO”) also bans bottom
trawling on specified seamounts on the high seas.330 The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(“CCAMLR”) bans bottom trawling in areas of the high seas (subject to few exceptions).331 The GFCM bars fishing on certain coral
reefs.332 The International Whaling Commission maintains a
Southern Ocean Sanctuary in which all commercial whaling is prohibited.333 In other words, if an Eel Agreement established a fishing ban in the high seas portions of the Sargasso Sea, it would not
be unusual in international law.
As for those areas of the Sargasso Sea within Bermuda’s exclusive economic zone, UNCLOS directs relevant States to cooperate in the management and regulation of catadromous species.334
The negotiators of an Eel Agreement could extend the measures
applicable to the high seas portion of the Sargasso Sea to those

329. NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures, supra note 107, at art. 17.
See Daniela Diz, Current Legal Developments: The Sargasso Sea, 31 INT’L J.
MARINE & COASTAL L. 359 (2016) (describing the efforts to ban bottom trawling in these areas).
330. SEAFO, Conservation Measure 30/15 on Bottom Fishing Activities and Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems in the SEAFO Convention Area art. 5(1), Dec.
3, 2015, https://perma.cc/2GYK-6X3G.
331. CCAMLR, Conservation Measure 22-05: Restrictions on the Use of Bottom
Trawling Gear in High-Seas Areas of the Convention Area, Oct. 27–Nov. 7,
2008, https://perma.cc/YHX4-KTP6.
332. GFCM, Recommendation GFCM/35/2011/2 on the Exploitation of Red Coral
in the GFCM Area of Application, 2011, https://perma.cc/J4XZ-WZSQ.
333. The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (“ICRW”) established the International Whaling Commission (“IWC”). International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling art. III(1), Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat.
1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948) [hereinafter ICRW].
The schedule, which includes the rules for whaling, is an integral part of the
ICRW. Id. at art. I(1). The prohibition against commercial whaling in the
two sanctuaries is found in paragraph 7 of the Schedule. ICRW Schedule as
Amended by the Commission at the 66th Meeting art. III, ¶ 7 (2016).
334. UNCLOS, supra note 221, at art. 67(3).
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areas within Bermuda’s exclusive economic zone, as the Eel Agreement would be a valid forum for fulfilling this duty to cooperate.
E.

Reporting

To ensure that the Parties/Signatories are working toward
achieving the objective of an Eel Agreement and acting consistently with their obligations and commitments, they should be required to report on their implementation of certain activities. At
the same time, an Eel Agreement should not establish reporting
obligations that conflict with those of other regimes, such as the
EU Eel Regulation. The EU Eel Regulation requires Member
States to report every three years on progress in the implementation of their EMPs. In particular, they must report the following
information:
(a) for each Member State, the proportion of the silver eel biomass that escapes toward the sea to spawn relative to
the target level of 40% escapement goal;
(b) for those Member States without an approved EMP, the
level of fishing effort exerted on eel each year, and the reduction realized relative to the 50% reduction in harvest
required by the Eel Regulation;
(c) the level of mortality factors outside the fishery (e.g.,
predators, hydroelectric turbines) and the reduction in
mortality realized; and
(d) the amount of glass eels caught less than 12 centimeters
in length and the proportions of this utilized for various
purposes.335
It appears that the EU Member States reported on implementation
of their EMPs in 2015, but no analysis of them has occurred.336
Whether that indicates a problem with the reports, the reporting
obligations themselves, or a lack of resources to undertake the
analysis is unknown. To the extent that the reporting obligations
themselves are not the problem, they could form the minimum
amount of information to report under an Eel Agreement. If an Eel
Agreement bars fishing in the Sargasso Sea or otherwise limits
335. EU Eel Regulation, supra note 13, at art. 9(1).
336. 2016 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 103, at 8 (“EU Member States again reported on progress with implementing their EMPs in 2015 but no official
post-evaluation has taken place.”).
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fishing in areas beyond an “eel basin,” then Parties/Signatories
should be required to report on measures taken to implement those
restrictions. Depending on other provisions of the Agreement, different reporting requirements may be advisable.
F.

Advisory Body

Any European Eel Agreement should include an advisory body
that can provide technical advice to the participating States and
territories. The advisory body could be a scientific committee or a
broader technical committee.
Due to the large number of unanswered questions concerning
the European eel’s life history and the primary threats to the eel
despite its precipitous population decline, a strong case can be
made for a scientific committee that prioritizes scientific research
needs and analyzes existing science. Most MEAs (e.g., CMS,
CITES) and RFMOs (e.g., ICCAT, NAFO) have a dedicated scientific committee.337 The Sharks MOU also has a scientific advisory
committee.338
At the same time, the conservation response to new scientific
information concerning European eels may have profound impacts
on law and policy and may require additional information concerning the feasibility of adopting certain technologies or implementing
new laws. Consequently, a broader technical committee may respond more meaningfully to the needs of the participating States
and territories. Several MEAs and CMS Agreements (e.g.,
AEWA339 and the Raptors MOU340) have adopted this approach.
337. See, e.g., CMS, supra note 18, at art. VIII (establishing a Scientific Council);
CITES Res. 11.1 (Rev. CoP17), Establishment of Committees, ¶ 2(b) (Sept.
24–Oct. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/4M4H-2YK7 (establishing an Animals
Committee and a Plants Committee).
338. Sharks MOU, supra note 164, ¶ 24.
339. AEWA, supra note 147, at art. VI(7). For more information on the AEWA
Technical Committee, see AEWA Technical Committee, AWEA,
https://perma.cc/F6B2-7WHJ.
340. Members of the Raptors Technical Advisory Group must have expertise in
raptor research, conservation, and/or management in order to provide advice on the implementation of the Raptors MOU, analyze scientific advice
and assessments for the purpose of proving recommendations to the Signatories, and provide comments on any proposals to amend the MOU text
which have a technical content. CMS, Report of the First Meetings of Signatories of the Raptors MOU, Doc. CMS/Raptors/MoS1/Report/Annex V, ¶¶ 1,
3–5, 8 (Dec. 10, 2013), https://perma.cc/EE2J-N52N.
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The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance341 has established a Scientific and Technical Review
Panel (“STRP”), comprising scientists and “technical experts.”342
The scientific experts provide advice on “the strategic direction of
scientific work needed to enhance the development of STRP products, and ensure the scientific quality of the finished products,”343
while the technical experts prepare “guidance, technical briefing
notes, Ramsar Technical Reports, etc., and solicit input and feedback on these from stakeholders and partners in all the Ramsar
regions.”344
AEWA has taken an approach similar to the Ramsar Convention, although it specifies a greater range of expertise for its Technical Committee. The AEWA Technical Committee comprises:
• Nine experts representing the different regions of the
Agreement Area (Northern and Southwestern Europe,
Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Southwestern Asia,
Northern Africa, Central Africa, Western Africa, Eastern
Africa, and Southern Africa), elected by the Parties;
• One representative appointed by each of the following organizations: the IUCN, Wetlands International, and the
International Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation; and
• One thematic expert, elected by the Parties, from each of
the following fields: rural economics, game management,
and environmental law.345
The general approach of AEWA might work quite well for a
European Eel Agreement. Given the broad geographic range of the
European eel, broad geographic representation on a technical com-

341. Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat arts. 6–7, opened for signature Feb. 2, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 11084,
996 U.N.T.S. 245 (entered into force Dec. 21, 1975) [hereinafter the Ramsar
Convention].
342. Ramsar Convention Res. XII.5, New Framework for Delivery of Scientific
and Technical Advice and Guidance on the Convention annex 1, ¶ 7 (June
1–9, 2015), https://perma.cc/SBF6-9GHY.
343. Id. ¶ 7 & n.2.
344. Id. ¶ 7 & n.3.
345. AEWA, Modus Operandi of the Technical Committee of the Agreement on
the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, Rule 2(1) (May
14–18, 2012), https://perma.cc/Q2DQ-9N7D.
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mittee would ensure that specific scientific and conservation concerns are addressed at the advisory body level. Due to the lack of
scientific information about the European eel, the AEWA approach
could be modified to ensure that the nine regional representatives
have scientific expertise, or perhaps a separate set of members
would have that expertise. The expert in game management would
be changed to an expert in fisheries or eel management.
Moreover, the establishment of a more general Technical Committee would help ensure that the work of the Joint
EIFAAC/ICES/GFCM Working Group on Eel (“WGEEL”) is not duplicated. Presently, the main objective of the WGEEL is to “report
on the status of the European eel stocks and provide advice to support development and implementation of EC Regulation No.
1100/2007 for eel stock recovery.”346 The WGEEL assesses European eel populations across its range.347 A member or two of the
WGEEL could participate as an expert on the Agreement’s Technical Committee. In the alternative, the Agreement could hire the
WGEEL to provide specific scientific services to the Parties/Signatories (as the EU does).348 The arrangement could be designed as
in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
(“WCPFC”).349 The WCPFC has its own Scientific Committee,350
but the science it reviews is provided by the Oceanic Fisheries Programme of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community.351

346. Joint EIFAAC/ICES/GFCM Working Group on Eels, INT’L COUNCIL FOR THE
EXPL. OF THE SEA, https://perma.cc/9QM6-85L3.
347. See, e.g., 2016 WGEEL REPORT, supra note 103, at 5, 11.
348. See ICES and EU Sign Memorandum of Understanding, INT’L COUNCIL FOR
THE EXPL. OF THE SEA (Mar. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/AA64-7UXX (“ICES
provides the European Union with scientific advice on fishing opportunities
for more than 220 fish stocks on an annual basis . . . .”).
349. The WCPFC was established by the Convention on the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central
Pacific Ocean art. 9(1), Sept. 5, 2000, 2275 U.N.T.S. 40532 (entered into force
June 19, 2004), https://perma.cc/75KV-YEJ4 [hereinafter WCPF Convention].
350. Id. at art. 11(1).
351. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean and the Pacific Community, at 1–3 (Mar. 15, 2016),
https://perma.cc/2QPQ-UP2M.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/1

60

228

Pace Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 35

G. Secretariat
In addition to identifying the tasks to be performed by the Secretariat, which have become somewhat boilerplate within MEAs
(e.g., review reports, organize meetings),352 negotiators of a European Eel Agreement must determine 1) the location of the Secretariat, 2) whether the Secretariat (and the Agreement itself) is associated with the United Nations or another entity or is
independent (like, e.g., ACAP), 3) staff size, and 4) whether any of
its staff are shared with CMS. These four issues are difficult to
untangle, as they are closely interrelated.
At the moment, at least four locations could provide some synergies for an Eel Secretariat, each with its own advantages and
disadvantages. None of these locations or institutions has made
any remarks about its willingness or capacity to host an Eel Secretariat. As such, this section is intended only to generate discussion.
The first and most obvious location for an Eel Secretariat is
Bonn, sharing space with the CMS Secretariat as well as staff from
EUROBATS, AEWA, and ASCOBANS. Sharing space with the
CMS Secretariat has several advantages, including the possibility
to share administrative staff. Germany has also shown an interest
in eel conservation by virtue of its proposal, on behalf of the EU, to
include the European eel in Appendix II of CITES.353 Germany is
a European eel Range State as well,354 which might make it amenable to hosting the secretariat.
In addition, if the Parties/Signatories to an Eel Agreement do
not believe that a full-time person is needed for a particular position, it may be possible to split the position with another CMS
Agreement, as ASCOBANS and the IOSEA Turtles MOU have
done. The ASCOBANS Coordinator spends 75% of her time on
ASCOBANS; the remaining time is spent as the CMS Marine
Mammals Officer.355 Similarly, the IOSEA Coordinator serves as
a part-time advisor to CMS, thus off-loading some of that salary on

352. See, e.g., CMS, supra note 18, at art. IX.
353. CITES, Consideration of Proposals for Amendment Of Appendices I and II,
CITES Doc. CoP14 Prop. 18 (June 3–15, 2007), https://perma.cc/U7LYQYAP.
354. JACOBY & GOLLOCK, supra note 16, at 4
355. Lee et al., supra note 176, ¶ 71.
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CMS.356 Such a scheme, of course, would require agreement among
the CMS Parties.
An advantage or disadvantage, depending on one’s perspective, of sharing space with the CMS Secretariat—and, by extension, integrating with the UN system—is that the UN charges 13%
for Programme Support Costs (“PSC”).357 This fee is assessed
against mandatory contributions and voluntary contributions
alike.358 The PSC fee is charged even if the funds are for specific
programmatic work (thus diverting programmatic funds towards
administration).359 Part of the funds from PSC charges are returned to CMS to pay for local administrative staff. The remainder
goes to the Nairobi office of the United Nations Environment Programme to pay administrative staff there that perform tasks on
behalf of CMS.
One disadvantage of splitting space with the CMS Secretariat
is that the CMS Secretariat is already operating at full capacity
and is considered understaffed.360 Without additional personnel
and financial resources, the CMS Secretariat will not be able to
perform secretariat functions for a new, active Eel Agreement
while also maintaining the same level of service for CMS and the
other MOUs.
In addition, if the Eel Agreement integrates with the CMS Secretariat, then all the rules of the United Nations Environment Programme relating to contracting, salary, and travel would apply.
The advantage is that these rules would not have to be written
anew; the disadvantage is their lack of flexibility.
A second possibility for housing the Eel Agreement Secretariat
might be with the Sargasso Sea Commission. As noted earlier, the
Sargasso Sea Commission has been a supporter of eel conservation,
356. Id. ¶ 54.
357. See CBD, Note on the 13 per cent Programme Support Costs (PSC), ¶ 3,
https://perma.cc/KZH2-KMWK [hereinafter CBD Note on PSC].
358. See Decision 80/44, U.N. Dev. Program, 27th Sess., 706th mtg. at 560, Doc.
E/1980/42/Rev.1 (June 27, 1980). The UN General Assembly approved the
UNDP’s formula for use by the United Nations Secretariat. G.A. Res. 35/217,
at art. V(2) (Dec. 17, 1980). As a program of the United Nations, UNEP,
including the agreements under its authority (such as CMS), falls within the
scope of the PSC formula.
359. Some exceptions have been made to this rule; for example, the EU pays 7%
PSC on its contributions. However, these exceptions are rare. See CBD Note
on PSC, supra note 357, ¶¶ 6–7.
360. Lee et al., supra note 176, ¶¶ 63–64, 132.
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including the eel’s sole spawning area: the Sargasso Sea.361 The
Sargasso Sea Commission is hosted by the IUCN in Washington,
D.C., which may not be ideal for an Eel Agreement initially focused
on the European eel. However, if the Eel Agreement is later expanded to include the American eel, as discussed in Section VII,
then locating a Secretariat within a Range State of that species
may be more acceptable to the Range States of the European eel.
The Anguillid Eel Specialist Group (“AESG”), hosted by the
Zoological Society of London, offers a third possibility.362 The
AESG identifies gaps in our scientific knowledge of anguillid species, advocates for their conservation, and provides a forum for discussing issues relating to these species.363 The Zoological Society
of London charges an administrative fee of 15%,364 but its London
location would provide easy access for most Range States.
Lastly, a fourth possibility would be to locate the Secretariat
within the territory of a CMS party that hosts an existing CMS
Agreement. Monaco, for example, is a European eel Range State,
and has shown an interest in eel conservation by submitting proposals to include the European eel in CMS Appendix II365 and for
a concerted action.366 It also already hosts the ACCOBAMS Secretariat, which is independent of CMS and the United Nations system. Synergy between the two Agreements is possible. With a fully
independent Agreement and Secretariat, whether in Monaco or
elsewhere, the Parties/Signatories would be allowed to establish
their own rules, including for salary, although Executive Secretaries of independent secretariats appear to have salaries similar to
those in the UN system.367
361. See supra Section V(9) (describing role of the Sargasso Sea Commission).
362. Anguillid Eel Specialist Group (AESG): About AESG, IUCN FRESHWATER
SPECIALIST GRP., https://perma.cc/F7VD-57EU.
363. Id.
364. Personal Communication with Dr. Matthew Gollock, supra note 58.
365. Proposal for the Inclusion of the European Eel (Anguilla anguilla) on CMS
Appendix II, supra note 208.
366. Concerted Action on the European Eel, supra note 28, at 1.
367. The salary of the International Whaling Commission’s Executive Secretary
has been posted as £94,365.97 British Pounds (USD122,477). INT’L WHALING
COMM’N, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION:
CANDIDATE
INFORMATION
PACK
6
(2017),
https://perma.cc/S2RS-D9EG. The 2017 salary of the ACAP Executive Secretary is AUS141,685 (USD112,385) for 2017. ACAP Res. 5.6, app. A (May
4–8, 2015). These salaries are similar to a D-1 or D-2 position within the UN
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Whatever choice the Parties/Signatories make, they should ensure that the Secretariat has legal personality.368 The Ramsar
Convention Secretariat, for example, does not have legal personality, and consequently some Ramsar Convention Parties have had
difficulties paying their contributions.369
H. Finance
To ensure the success of an Eel Agreement, the participating
States and Territories must be willing to contribute sufficient resources. As of 2010, three of the seven legally binding Agreements
lacked funds to ensure successful implementation of their work
plan,370 and “most” MOU operational and project-specific work was
underfunded.371
As noted earlier, no current CMS Agreement is an adequate
comparator for a potential Eel Agreement. The Dugong, Sharks,
and IOSEA Turtle MOUs are the closest comparators, but they
have significant differences. Thus, it is difficult to assess with great
accuracy what an Eel Agreement might cost annually.

368.

369.

370.
371.

system, not accounting for benefit packages and adjustments for post location. Pay and Benefits, U.N. CAREERS, https://perma.cc/6GB6-4VFY.
The legal personality of a Secretariat is established in the Headquarters
Agreement between the host government and the decision-making body of
the Agreement. The first paragraph of the ACCOBAMS headquarters agreement, for example, provides as follows:
1. The Government of H.S.H. the Prince of Monaco shall recognize the
legal personality of the Permanent Secretariat and, for the purposes
of carrying out its statutory responsibilities, its capacity:
- to contract,
- to acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property,
- to be a party to legal proceedings.
ACCOBAMS Res. 6.2, Amendment to the Headquarters Agreement with the
Host Government, Doc. MOP6/2016/Res.6.2, annex 1, at art. I(1) (2016),
perma.cc/MPN4-29S6.
Ramsar Convention, Legal Status of the Ramsar Convention Secretariat,
Doc. SC36-16, at 3 (Feb. 27–29, 2008), https://perma.cc/U4CK-6NGU. For
more information about the relationship between the Ramsar Convention
Secretariat and the IUCN, see BHARAT H. DESAI, MULTILATERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: LEGAL STATUS OF THE SECRETARIATS 181–89
(2010).
Lee et al., supra note 176, ¶ 87.
Id. ¶ 89.
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The Dugong MOU, as noted above, covers a single species
across 46 Range States and territories and operates in a single language. The Dugong Secretariat is run out of the CMS office in Abu
Dhabi.372 The Dugong MOU is staffed by a P4 Programme Officer,
a P2 Programme Officer, and an Administrative and Finance Assistant.373 These full-time staff are supported by an Executive Coordinator (0.33 P5 FTE) and another P2 Programme Officer (0.5
FTE).374 When fully staffed, the core budget is slightly more than
USD600,000.375 In addition, these staff submitted proposals to conduct on-the-ground conservation projects, receiving a USD5.88million grant.376 In other words, successful implementation of the
Dugong MOU requires both core funding as well as project funding.
Significantly, the Dugong MOU has been entirely funded since its
establishment in 2009 by the Environment Agency–Abu Dhabi.377
At the last meeting of the Signatories, the Secretariat sought to
diversify funding by seeking voluntary contributions of
USD120,000 for program activities from the Signatories based on
a modified version of the UN Scale of Assessments, a proposal that
the Signatories adopted.378
The IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU379 may also provide a useful
reference point. The IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU has 35 Signatories; applies to the waters and coastal States of the Indian Ocean
and Southeast Asia and adjacent seas, extending eastwards to the
Torres Strait;380 and covers the loggerhead, olive ridley (L. olivacea), green, hawksbill, leatherback, and flatback (Natator depressus) sea turtles.381 The MOU’s Conservation and Management
Plan includes 24 programs and 105 specific activities, focusing on
reducing threats, conserving critical habitat, exchanging scientific
372. See Dugong MOU Secretariat, Current Financial Status and Future Funding,
Doc.
CMS/Dugong/MOS3/13.1,
¶
3
(Jan.
12,
2017),
https://perma.cc/NS5C-GMAD.
373. Id. at annex 1, tbls.1 & 2.
374. Id.
375. Id. at tbl.2.
376. Id. ¶ 16.
377. Id. ¶ 2.
378. Dugong MOU, Rep. of the Third Meeting of the Signatories to the Dugong
MOU, Doc. CMS/Dugong/MOS3*, ¶¶ 137–42 (June 14, 2017),
https://perma.cc/6QVB-VF4J.
379. See IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, supra note 154.
380. Id. at Definitions, ¶ 3.
381. Id. at Definitions, ¶ 1.
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data, increasing public awareness and participation, promoting regional cooperation, and seeking resources for implementation.382 It
had a budget of USD945,000 for the 2015–2017 triennium, with
the CMS budget contributing USD27,000 per year383 towards the
Coordinator’s salary for CMS-related work. This arrangement is
subject to the decision of Parties on the CMS Budget at COP12.
The Sharks MOU has a global scope and covers 29 species of
sharks and rays across their marine habitats,384 whereas an Eel
Agreement would be regional and would cover a single species. The
Sharks MOU has 48 signatories,385 which may be similar to the
number for an Eel Agreement (with 57 Range States and territories), but the Shark MOU Signatories come from all over the world,
and many of them are developing countries that receive funding to
participate in meetings. A much smaller number of potential participating States and territories in an Eel Agreement are developing countries. The Sharks MOU has an Advisory Committee comprising 10 members.386 It operates in three languages: English,
French, and Spanish.387
The Sharks MOU had a budget of 1,145,866 Euros (approximately USD1,246,380 in January 2016) for the 2013–2015 triennium, although it received only USD645,752 in voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund (additional voluntary contributions were
received for specific projects).388 The CMS Secretariat provided an
additional in-kind contribution of 186,501 Euros in the form of staff
time,389 and the German Government paid for a P2 officer for two
of the three years of the triennium.390 The budget anticipated the
hiring of a P3 officer, which was budgeted at 438,020 Euros for the
triennium.391 The costs of one Meeting of the Signatories and one
382. Id. at Conservation & Management Plan.
383. IOSEA Marine Turtles MOU, Rep. of the Seventh Meeting of IOSEA Signatory States, annex 6, at 83–84 (Sept. 2014), https://perma.cc/UUA3-LL5Y.
384. Sharks: Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Migratory
Sharks, CMS ANIMALS, https://perma.cc/GF2R-3FEW.
385. Id.
386. Sharks MOU, supra note 164, at annex 2, at 1.
387. Id. ¶ 34.
388. Sharks MOU, Rep. on the Implementation of the Budget for the Triennium
2013–2015, Doc. CMS/Sharks/MOS2/Doc.10.2 ¶¶ 3, 5 (Jan. 7, 2016),
https://perma.cc/F9N4-94XP.
389. Id. ¶ 3.
390. Id. ¶ 10.
391. Id. at annex 2, at 7.
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meeting of the Advisory Committee were estimated at 235,553 Euros,392 with a large portion of those costs allocated to interpretation
(30,000 Euros) and support for delegate participation (82,500 Euros).393 The costs of hosting a Meeting of the Signatories do not
account for the costs borne by the host government; Costa Rica, the
host of the First Advisory Committee meeting and the Second
Meeting of the Signatories, was financially responsible for the
venue (including microphones and other relevant technology for
the meeting), a work room for the Secretariat, and rooms for working groups.394
The Sharks MOU budget for the 2016–2018 triennium is
1,037,829 Euros, which covers a P2 position395 and 50% of an administrative position,396 with additional in-kind support provided
by the CMS Secretariat.397 This budget covers meetings but very
little programmatic work, with only 15,000 Euros per year allocated for analytical work.398 Other aspects of the work plan are
implemented by the single P2 position.
Because of the relatively small number of developing countries
that would require travel assistance, presumably the budget for a
European Eel Agreement would have smaller amounts allocated
for this purpose.399 Similarly, the use of only two languages would
reduce the cost of interpretation and translation significantly.
Staff costs would be dependent on the number and type of personnel hired. But given the similarity in scope to the Sharks MOU,

392. Id. ¶ 14.
393. Id. at annex 2, at 8.
394. Letter from Bradnee Chambers, Exec. Sec’y, CMS, to Edgar Gutiérrez Espleta, Minister for Env’t & Energy, Costa Rica (July 13, 2015).
395. In the United Nations system, a P2 position is a professional position that
requires a minimum of two years of work experience. Staff Categories, U.N.
CAREERS, https://perma.cc/U2FZ-PNQX.
396. Sharks MOU, Administrative and Budgetary Matters, Doc.
CMS/Sharks/Outcome 2.5, annex 1, at 2 (Feb. 20, 2016),
https://perma.cc/B2CB-TABG.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. The following European eel Range States appear to be eligible for funding:
Albania, Algeria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Georgia, Lebanon Libya, Macedonia Mauritania, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Syrian
Arab Republic Tunisia and Ukraine.
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one full-time P2 or P3 professional officer and one part-time administrative assistant would be considered a minimal requirement.
As for languages of a European Eel Agreement, English and
Arabic might be the two most relevant. The Range States of Europe
speak more than a dozen languages, but English would be a common language spoken by most government officials. Arabic is the
most common first language among other Range States (Algeria,
Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia). Making Arabic an official language may entice these Range States to participate. While Arabic is not a working language of CMS or any of its
Agreements, this could be accommodated without too much difficulty.
VII. EXTENSION TO THE AMERICAN EEL
The American eel (A. rostrata) also faces conservation challenges, although they do not appear to be as severe as those facing
the European eel. The American eel has been classified as “Endangered” on the IUCN Red List for reasons similar to the European
eel: “hydropower turbines; poor body condition; climate change
and/or changes in oceanic currents; disease and parasites (particularly A. crassus); exploitation and trade of glass, yellow and silver
eels; hydrology; habitat loss; pollutants; and predation.”400 As with
the European eel, the scientific data gaps concerning the life history and threats to the American eel are significant.401 Consequently, the question arises as to whether a European Eel Agreement could be expanded to include the American eel.402
Procedurally, the inclusion of the American eel could be easily
arranged. As with other Agreements, the species to be protected
would be placed in an Annex to the Eel Agreement. The Parties/Signatories could add species to the Annex at subsequent
400. DAVID JACOBY ET AL., IUCN, THE IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED SPECIES –
ANGUILLA ROSTRATE, AMERICAN EEL 2 (2017), https://perma.cc/R8JL-HTAT.
401. See id. at 2, 3, 6, 16 (noting the “relative lack of understanding of the
threats”); see also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., AMERICAN EEL (ANGUILLA
– 12-MONTH PETITION FINDING FORM
7
(2015),
ROSTRATA)
https://perma.cc/8M2X-P4KQ (stating that “no rangewide estimate of American eel abundance exists” and “specific information on demographic structure is lacking and difficult to determine”).
402. Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, supra note
24, ¶¶ 145–52.
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meetings, provided that the Agreement gives the Parties/Signatories that authority. This is, of course, the way CMS itself operates,403 as does ACAP,404 AEWA,405 and the Sharks MOU,406
among others.407
The oddity of this approach under an Eel Agreement is that
none of the Range States of the American eel are likely to participate in the vote to include the American eel in the Agreement’s
Annex since they are unlikely to be a Party/Signatory to an Eel
Agreement focusing on the European eel. Nonetheless, Parties/Signatories frequently add species to the list of covered species in the
absence of a Range State408 or even against the will of a Range
State.409 Presumably, however, the Eel Agreement would include
provisions to allow for participation as observers by non-Range
States and non-Parties or non-Signatories, as is generally the case
in multilateral environmental agreements410 and CMS MOUs.411
In this way, they would be allowed to participate in the discussions
and voice their opinions, although they would not have the right to
vote.

403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

CMS, supra note 18, at art. XI.
ACAP, supra note 147, at art. VIII(13)(a)–(e).
AEWA, supra note 147, at art. X(5).
Sharks MOU, supra note 164, ¶ 20.
Raptors MOU, supra note 275, ¶¶ 15, 22.
Several shark species were included in the CMS Appendix II at COP11 despite the absence of or lack of participation by many Range States, such as
the United States, Canada, and Mexico, all of whom are CMS non-Parties.
However, many of shark Range States did participate and agree to list these
shark species. Parties and Range States, CMS, https://perma.cc/GE4FADD3 (last updated Dec. 1, 2017).
409. For example, the southern African countries have been opposed to many of
the decisions taken concerning the African elephant in CITES. In 2016, Namibia and Zimbabwe submitted proposals 14, 15, and 16 to allow commercial
trade in ivory and other elephant specimens while many West and East African countries sought to prohibit all commercial trade in ivory and other
elephant parts. See Seventeenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties—
Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CITES,
https://perma.cc/GFZ2-6BVZ.
410. See, e.g., CMS, supra note 18, at art. VII(8); CITES, supra note 14, at art.
XI(6).
411. See, e.g., Sharks MOU, supra note 164, ¶ 22.
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The inclusion of the American eel, with 43 additional Range
States and territories,412 in an Eel Agreement would certainly increase costs. Many of these States and territories are developing
countries that would require funds to participate in meetings. In
addition, several speak Spanish as their native language.413 Adding this language to the Agreement would likely enhance their participation but, of course, would also add costs for translation and
interpretation. Adding the American eel to an Eel Agreement
would likely also require expansion of any advisory committee to
accommodate the scientific and technical expertise from relevant
Range States and territories.
Because the American eel and the European eel face similar
threats, it is possible that any Action Plan developed for the European eel could also apply to the American eel. Action plans are intended to be iterative documents subject to amendment, so any actions specific to the American eel could be incorporated into the
action plan at a meeting of the Parties/Signatories.
Some participants at the First Range States Workshop on the
European Eel noted that more management work was needed in
American eel Range States before inclusion of the American eel in
the Agreement would be productive.414 On the one hand, inclusion
of the American eel in the Agreement could catalyze development
of management plans. On the other hand, the lack of eel management expertise could establish obligations that simply are not implementable in a reasonable period of time. Clearly, the Range
States will need to determine which step to take first.

412. The Range States and territories are Anguilla; Antigua and Barbuda;
Aruba; Bahamas; Barbados; Belize; Bermuda; Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and
Saba; Canada; Cayman Islands; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cuba; Curaçao; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Greenland; Grenada; Guadeloupe; Haiti; Honduras; Jamaica; Martinique; Mexico; Montserrat; Nicaragua; Panama; Puerto
Rico; Saint Barthélemy; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Martin
(French part); Saint Pierre and Miquelon; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Sint Maarten (Dutch part); Trinidad and Tobago; Turks and Caicos
Islands; United States; Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of; Virgin Islands,
British; and Virgin Islands, United States. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 400, at
4.
413. Colombia, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and
Venezuela. Id.
414. Rep. of the First Range States Workshop on the European Eel, supra note
24, ¶¶ 147–48.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The European eel is considered “Critically Endangered.” Its
population continues to decline due to overutilization, barriers to
migration such as dams, habitat loss, pollution, and climate
change. The international community has responded by including
the European eel in Appendix II of CITES in order to regulate international trade, the List of Threatened and/or Declining species
under OSPAR to help establish conservation priorities to protect
marine biodiversity, and Appendix II of CMS to help improve the
species conservation status. The EU has taken regional action to
prohibit imports into and exports from EU Member States, although intra-EU trade is permissible.
Despite this international and regional action, the eel’s conservation status might not be improving. The eel’s Appendix II status on CITES regulates only international trade; CITES does not
have competence to address other threats to the eel. OSPAR is limited to an area in the Northeast Atlantic, omitting vast areas of the
eel’s range. The CMS Appendix II listing for the European eel does
not impose any specific conservation obligations on the Parties. No
other international treaty has the competence to manage the full
suite of threats across the European eel’s range.
The conservation of the European eel would benefit from international management coordinated through a new international
legal instrument. CMS, with the possibility for legally binding and
non-legally binding instruments, provides an opportunity to coordinate those efforts. Unlike other international agreements, a legal
instrument negotiated under CMS can cover the full range of the
European eel’s habitat, including all freshwater and marine habitats, and address the full range of threats to the species.
Evidence indicates that the legal status of a CMS instrument
is not per se indicative of whether the instrument will be successful. However, legally binding CMS instruments tend to have more
stable funding, and stable funding is linked to more successful conservation outcomes. If a commitment of funds can be arranged, a
non-legally binding MOU may more quickly enter into force and
achieve conservation benefits for the species.
Regardless of the instrument’s legal status, it should include
a range of provisions, such as those to prohibit or regulate taking;
prohibit or regulate trade, potentially through a CDS; establish an
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advisory body to bring new scientific information to bear on possible new management strategies; and reporting obligations to help
monitor the success or failure of management strategies.
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